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**OIL, HONOR AND RELIGION: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
TURKEY, 1923-1927**

BY

**AYKUT KILINC
B.A., Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, 2000**

THESIS

**Submitted to the University of New Hampshire in Partial Fulfillment of the
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
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
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PREFACE

The six-hundred year old Ottoman Empire came to an end after a defeat in the Great War. A new Turkish nationalist movement emerged against the Allied occupation in Asia Minor, largely made up of the Greek army, in 1919. Against the Greek occupying forces, the Turks won their War of Independence and established the Turkish Republic in 1923. This thesis examines U.S. foreign relations with the new Turkish Republic between 1923 and 1927. As an introduction, the first chapter will explain the relationship between the United States and the Ottoman Empire through the end of the Great War. The second chapter will focus on the 1922-23 treaty negotiations at Lausanne among Turkey, the U.S., and the Allied Powers, mainly Britain, France and Italy. The last chapter will study the American peoples' reaction to the Lausanne Treaty until early 1927.

This thesis primarily depends on U.S. historical resources. Without distinction, most of these resources define the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, the Republic of Turkey, as Turkey. In order to emphasize the difference, the thesis refers to these countries as the Ottoman Empire until its end in 1923, unless in direct quotation, and Turkey after 1923. The place names that were unanimously spelled the same are not translated into their modern Turkish names – the modern names did not become official until the Turkish adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1929.¹ For instance, Smyrna, Constantinople and Angora are not translated into

¹ This style is borrowed from Leland James Gordon's *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation*. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932).

Izmir, Istanbul or Ankara. Since the lesser known place names were spelled differently from one resource to another, I chose to use their modern names. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the Lausanne Treaty is sometimes referred to as the Treaty, and the Department of State as the Department. Asia Minor and Anatolia are used interchangeably to define the current Turkish land mass on the Asian side of the country. The Near East in this work entails the entire Middle East regardless whether certain lands in the Middle East were under Ottoman control during the time of this study.

The third chapter largely explains how the Turks' massacre and dislocation of Armenians during and after the Great War affected American public opinion, and as a result how the public wanted to influence U.S. foreign policy to help the Armenians. The goal is to explore how the Armenian Genocide informed the American people's foreign policy choices. It is beyond the focus of this thesis to narrate the Armenian Genocide or verify the accuracy of American people's knowledge about what actually happened. The thesis operates within common American perceptions of Turks and the events that took place.

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ABSTRACT

OIL, HONOR AND RELIGION: UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS TURKEY, 1923-1927

by

Aykut Kilinc

University of New Hampshire, September, 2007

The U.S. and Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and established equal relations. In 1927, the U.S. Senate rejected this treaty. The Coolidge administration, however, ignored the Senate's rejection and activated the Treaty shortly thereafter. This study was conducted to determine why the Lausanne Treaty was rejected and how it survived. Under investigation were: the origins of the U.S. foreign policy in the Near East, the Lausanne Conference negotiations, and the American public's reaction to the Lausanne Treaty. The Lausanne Treaty was a result of a persistent U.S. Open Door foreign policy that was supported by the new Turkish government. But an important segment of the American public strenuously objected to this policy. Furthermore, the Turks' massacre of its Armenians minority population in large scales in 1914 and 1915 galvanized the American public against the Turks. Despite these factors, the Lausanne Treaty survived because the anti-Lausanne Treaty movement lost momentum due to some people's rejection of the prejudiced propaganda and a weary U.S. public turning its attention elsewhere.

INTRODUCTION

After a long train journey from Angora to Constantinople on March 5, 1927, Rear Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, American High Commissioner to Turkey, took the ferry from Haydar Pasha Station to Perha with Mrs. Bristol. The cool Mediterranean wind felt nicer than the cold and dusty Angora air during their short but magical journey from the Asian to the European side of the city. Numerous joyful embassy staff and the American residents of Constantinople greeted the Bristols.¹ The American Diaspora at Constantinople believed that the Turkish treaty in Bristol's briefcase, originally signed in 1923 at Lausanne, Switzerland but never ratified by the Senate, would protect their schools, businesses and relief efforts in the Near East. Although the 1923 Lausanne Treaty had been rejected by the Senate only a month before, by sending Bristol to Angora right after the Senate's rejection, the Calvin Coolidge Administration officially recognized the new Turkish Republic and agreed to have a relationship based on equality and international law. This study explores the factors that contributed to the Senate's rejection of the Lausanne Treaty in January 1927. Furthermore, it explains how the rejected Lausanne Treaty survived and was activated despite the Senate's non-ratification.

This work will operate on four levels, each of which is influenced by four historians and their theories. Although these historians, Walter LaFeber, Matthew

¹ Mark Lambert Bristol, (Unpublished Diary), March 5, 1927, Box 8, File: February and March 1927, Mark Lambert Bristol Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington).

Connelly, Michael Hunt and Kristin Hoganson, did not specifically write about Turkish-American relations during the 1920's, they influenced this work with their approach to the origins of U.S. foreign policy. The first level argues that the U.S. applied an Open Door policy between 1909 and 1927 in the Near East.

The U.S. Open Door policy emerged from the idea of preventing European powers from creating spheres of influence in China so that the U.S. businesses could invest freely in the region. When the U.S. decided to expand its influence over the Pacific Ocean at the end of the nineteenth century, the European powers had already parceled out China. Rejecting the European nations' creation of spheres of influence in China, John Milton Hay (1838-1905), Secretary of State, sent notes to Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy and France in 1899.¹ Unlike the traditional imperial tendencies of the old world powers, which was divide and rule, the U.S. advocated maintaining the political entity of China while allowing all powers to invest in the country freely. The U.S. began to apply the same policy to the Near East during the William Taft administration. The Secretary of State at the time, Philander C. Knox, was a strong advocate of the Open Door policy.

In his groundbreaking book, *The New Empire*, Walter LaFeber emphasized that from the beginning the U.S. deliberately sought to establish an economic empire.² LaFeber challenged previously widespread theories that claimed U.S. policy makers for a short period of time at the turn of the twentieth century fancied

¹ Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), 363.

² Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1963).

creating an imperial power. According to these earlier theories, the imperial frenzy ended during the early 1920's.³ LaFeber, however, showed us that from the early days of its establishment, the U.S. was destined to be an economic empire and that was why according to him, the declaration of the U.S. as an imperial power in mid nineteenth century was a logical historical development.⁴ The new-left historians had already declared that the U.S. was established as an empire.⁵ Building his theory on this premise, LaFeber revolutionized the "empire" theory: American industrialization during the nineteenth century and the maturation of the empire went hand in hand.⁶ By the end of the nineteenth century, LaFeber maintains that American capitalists and foreign policy makers came to a conclusion that a U.S. economic empire "would be the balm for international and domestic ills."⁷ This thesis validates LaFeber's theory in the sense that foreign policy makers and businessmen helped each other to create a post-Great War U.S. foreign policy for the Near East. Under this policy, the U.S. needed to apply an Open Door framework in the region in order to maintain its economic growth by exploiting the oil reserves of the Near East, as well as world peace.

³ For example, in his book, *America's Colonial Experience: How the United States gained, governed, and in part gave away a colonial empire* (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1951), historian Julius W. Pratt claimed that the withdrawal from imperial power mentality began when Warren Harding became president in 1921, 313.

⁴ LaFeber, 60.

⁵ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, second edition (New York: Delta, 1962), 19. Richard W. Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1960), 1.

⁶ LaFeber, 6.

⁷ *Ibid*, 373.

Second, during the Lausanne Conference, the Turks welcomed the U.S. Open Door policy, and furthermore, they encouraged it. Turkey's priority was to emerge as a sovereign nation from the Lausanne negotiations. Their primary diplomatic tool during the negotiations was to pit the U.S. Open Door policy against British imperialism. Matthew Connelly studied the impact of the Algerian War of Independence on great power politics. According to Connelly, the Algerian Revolution was "distinctively *diplomatic* in nature, and most decisive struggles occurred in the international arena."⁸ He demonstrated that Algerian nationalists exploited differences between super powers and played off them in order to achieve independence.⁹ Algerian nationalists were aware of Cold War diplomacy and created their own space within it to realize their independence. During the time frame of Connelly's book, mostly 1950's and 1960's, Algeria took advantage of the Cold War ideological struggle. This work applies this small power strategy to the Turkish War of Independence. During the 1920's, great powers were struggling for spheres of influence and natural resources. Turkish nationalists used this struggle to their advantage by playing the U.S. against Britain.

Third, the public's rejection of the Treaty provided policy makers with the ideological foundation to shape their policy towards Turkey, usually in the form of protecting American honor and racial and religious prejudice. The coalition against normalized relations with Turkey and the Open Door policy, however, was not sustained after the Treaty was rejected because a pragmatist approach gained

⁸ Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4.

⁹ Ibid, 277.

ground among citizens, policy makers, and even those people who previously opposed any type of relations with Turkey. This premise applies Michael Hunt's "ideology" in order to explain the relationship between public rhetoric against Turkey and the Turks and the rejection of Lausanne Treaty.

Michael Hunt introduced ideology as the central component in foreign policymaking.¹⁰ According to Hunt, ideology helps the policy makers and the public to constitute a framework in which policy makers can "reduce complicated problems to manageable proportions...to marshal support at home for the choices they had made."¹¹ Thus, Hunt suggests ideology as a two-lane road: on one side, policy makers explain complicated matters to the public by using simple and ideologically loaded terms – national greatness, racial hierarchy and anti-revolutionary attitude. On the other side, by constantly making ideological choices, people affect the policy makers' decision making process. The "ideology" theory helps us better understand the relationship between the anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim attitude in public and the policy makers' strategic approach towards U.S.-Turkish relations.

Fourth, the opponents of ratifying the Lausanne Treaty advocated for relinquishing the Open Door policy and the (re)establishment of a foreign policy based on ethics and morality. The individuals, religious organizations, and interest groups who demanded this shift mobilized against the U.S. policy in the Near East, particularly against the 1923 Lausanne Treaty that they believed was a

¹⁰ Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 3.

¹¹ Ibid, 16.

manifestation of the Open Door policy. Religious figures, nationalists and Wilsonian moralists created a front that criticized the Open Door policy and advocated to honor the previous promises of the U.S. towards the minorities in Turkey. The opponents also despised the idea of establishing an equal relationship with a backward, Muslim state that had recently massacred ten of thousands of Christian Armenians. During the next four years, they pleaded for the rejection of the Treaty. The anti-Open Door front fed its dissatisfaction with the direction of U.S. foreign policy by creating a racial, gender and religious rhetoric. The work of Kristin Hoganson helps define this phenomenon.

In her book, *Fighting for American Manhood*, Kristin Hoganson explained the origins of the Spanish-American and Philippine-American wars. Hoganson convincingly argued that gender politics was an influential factor in the determination of U.S. foreign policy.¹² According to her, a masculine desire to defend American honor drove policy makers to the wars with Spain and the Philippines. Hoganson illustrated that before the war with Spain over Cuba, there were many accounts depicting Cuba as a female waiting to be rescued from Spain.¹³ This work borrows Hoganson's illuminating concept of the gender roles in U.S. foreign policy and applies it to explain the way in which many individuals rallied behind the idea of rescuing Christian women from brutal Turks.

¹² Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 200.

¹³ Ibid, 51.

By using these four interrelated historical approaches as the framework, this work illustrates that the U.S. applied an aggressive Open Door policy in the Near East from 1908 through 1920's. Furthermore, it argues that studying the public debate over the Lausanne Treaty helps one to understand the way in which gender, American honor and religious beliefs provided the policy makers with an ideological rationale to oppose the Treaty. Finally, it demonstrates that a small state, like Turkey, can create a role for itself in world politics and manipulate the big power politics for its interests.

Signed on August 6, 1923, the Lausanne Treaty reestablished diplomatic and commercial relations between Turkey and the U.S., which had been severed with the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917. As I will detail in this thesis, many Americans accurately understood that the U.S.'s main objective was to make sure that U.S. business interests had an equal share in the Near Eastern markets after the Great War. These Americans believed that the U.S. served the interests of big corporations, especially the Standard Oil Company of New York, by primarily seeking oil concessions in the region. They opposed the premise that Open Door should be the driving force of U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, due to the Turkish massacre of Armenian civilians during the Great War, they believed that ratification of the Treaty would legitimize Turkish brutal acts and prevent Armenians from building their own country.

In January, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson issued the Fourteen Points that the U.S. wanted to accomplish at the end of the Great War. The twelfth point was to abolish the Ottoman Empire and create independent national states – an

Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia was one of them.¹⁴ In early 1920's, because of Wilson's promise, many Americans believed that the U.S. had a legal as well as a moral obligation towards the Armenians. The Treaty of Lausanne asked the American people to forget Wilson's promise to create an Armenian state in the Near East, disregard the Turkish brutalities against the Christians during the war, and be on equal terms with an under-developed Muslim state. Turks' ill-treatment of the Christian subjects was unacceptable to many Americans, who commonly believed that young Christian girls were kept in harems in Turkey and forced to marry Turkish men.

A combination of anti-Turkish sentiment and disdain for the Open Door policy became a hotly debated domestic political issue when the Democratic Party added a plank denouncing the Treaty to its election platform in 1924. This politicized anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim attitudes, together with a broader dissatisfaction about the materialistic direction of U.S. foreign policy, resulted in the rejection of the Lausanne Treaty in January 1927.

Although many Americans revolted against the Treaty, there were also Americans who supported the idea of establishing equal relations with the new Turkish Republic. The supporters believed that the new Turkey was on its way to becoming a country guided by rule of law. They claimed that the U.S. business, philanthropic and educational interests in the region could be defended only by ratifying the Treaty. In other words, Turkish laws would protect the American people and properties in the country. When the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty

¹⁴ Robert H. Ferrell, *Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 482.

finally came to the Senate floor in January 17, 1927, the Senate could not produce the two-thirds majority to ratify the Lausanne Treaty although it did show large support for the idea – while 54 voted for it, 30 rejected it.

A few weeks after the Lausanne Treaty was rejected, President Calvin Coolidge asked Admiral Bristol to conclude a new treaty with Turkey. Bristol took the train from Constantinople to Angora immediately. In less than two weeks Bristol and the Angora government put together a new treaty which fundamentally put the Lausanne Treaty into effect. The Democratic Senators who voted against the Treaty remained silent for the most part about President Coolidge's disregard of their votes. According to one journalist, the major reason for this silence was the fact that many Senators voted against the Treaty just to humiliate the President before the upcoming presidential elections.¹⁵ After achieving their goal, they did not question the President's unilateral action to establish normal relations with Turkey. The most serious response came from William H. King of Utah a year later when he introduced a resolution that accused President Coolidge of violating both the "spirit and letter of the Constitution."¹⁶

Although the U.S. Open Door policy in the Near East was attacked by many Americans, it ultimately remained intact. This work argues that there were two major reasons why the Open Door policy was challenged but not destroyed. First, Open Door policy did not meet any resistance from Turkey, and in fact, Turkey

¹⁵ Constantine Brown, the Chicago Daily News correspondent at London, to Bristol, February 25, 1927, Bristol Papers.

¹⁶ Resolution 194, April 10, 1927. *Congressional Record* Vol. 69, PT.4-6, PG.3493-6962, 1928 Cong. 70, Sess. 1, microfilm No. 178, 6142.

openly advocated for U.S. involvement in the Near East. Turkey wanted the U.S. to balance the European Allied powers' imperialistic demands by extending its Open Door policy into the Near East. When the first meeting at Lausanne did not produce any results in late 1922, Turkey granted the Chester Concessions to gain the U.S.'s support for the second round of meetings. In as much as the original reason for the U.S.'s participation in the Lausanne Conference was to defend the Open Door policy, the Turks made the application of the Open Door policy easy for American diplomats.

Secondly, the public movement against the Treaty lost the support of many Americans who believed that the criticism of the Treaty had lost touch with reality and became mere racial and political propaganda. When the U.S. government attempted to normalize its relations with Turkey based on the Lausanne Treaty despite its recent rejection by the Senate, there was no strong opposition left to mobilize against the government's decision. This work postulates, therefore, that small powers like Turkey influenced U.S. foreign policy by granting incentives. Furthermore, a genuine American public movement against an aggressive Open Door policy in the Near East lost its legitimacy due to relying on rhetoric based on propaganda and generating an unfair racial prejudice against the Turks.

Historiography and Methodology

In the limited historical studies on Turkish-American relations during the interwar period, there is not an extensive analysis of the rejection of the Lausanne Treaty. The reason for this oversight is that the rejection of the Treaty in January 1927 did not have much impact on the subsequent relations between the two

countries. After all, relations with Turkey were normalized quickly and historians did not pay much attention to Turkish-American relations until the end of the Second World War when Turkey became an early recipient of Marshall Plan aid.¹⁷ This work argues, however, that there is much to learn from the debate over the Lausanne Treaty.

A detailed historical account of Turkish American relations during the 1920's was written by Leland James Gordon in 1932.¹⁸ Gordon's book on U.S. relations with Turkey between 1830 and 1930 from an economic perspective is still the most authoritative study on the subject. According to Gordon, after the Lausanne Treaty was signed, "an unexpected" opposition emerged in the U.S. By putting the rejection of the treaty in their 1924 election plank, the Democratic Party made it a political issue.¹⁹ Gordon explained that the negative view of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey was due to their treatment of non-Muslims which caused the American public to have a strong opinion about the treaty.²⁰

An expert on Turkish-American relations between 1914 and 1939, Roger R. Trask, rightly claimed that strong religious and Armenian-lobby opposition, as well as the partisan struggle between the Republican and the Democratic parties, were

¹⁷ For instance, in his book, historian William Hale did not mention the U.S. role at the Lausanne Conference. According to him, the major players were Britain, Turkey and the Soviet Union. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 52. Hale claimed that the U.S. withdrew from world politics after 1920, 3.

¹⁸ Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932).

¹⁹ Ibid, 22.

²⁰ Ibid, 32.

the main factors behind the rejection of the ratification.²¹ By exploring several resources in their books, Gordon and Trask created a well defined framework to study the subject. But both Gordon's and Trask's examinations of the debate about the Lausanne Treaty are incomplete. Trask also neglected to address the U.S. Open Door policy in the Near East. By ignoring the relationship between the public perception of the Lausanne Treaty and the decision making process of the politicians, Trask did not identify the ideological origins of U.S. foreign policy.

Although Gordon convincingly established the historical background of the U.S. Open Door policy in the Near East, he fell short of admitting its significance to the Lausanne negotiations. He also disregarded the channels that the American public used to influence the statesmen's decisions. Furthermore, Gordon did not consider the ways in which the Turkish diplomatic maneuvers affected the policy makers during the Lausanne Conference. The most serious flaw of the book, however, is Gordon's unquestioning acceptance of the claim by Joseph Grew, the chief U.S. negotiator at Lausanne, that Grew was not aware of the Chester Concession during the Lausanne negotiations.²² Thus, Gordon missed the most important piece in the U.S. foreign relations apparatus at Lausanne which was the Open Door policy. The main objective of the U.S. at Lausanne was to protect the Chester Concession against Britain.

²¹ Roger R. Trask, *The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform 1914-1939* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 37.

²² Gordon, 33.

After the bloody Great War, many historians believed that Americans wanted to go back to "normalcy" and did not want the U.S. to involve itself in world affairs.²³ The failure to ratify the Versailles Treaty in 1919 was considered to be the end of Wilsonian idealism. It was believed that the election of 1920 was a referendum for internationalism or isolationism and the American people preferred the latter. This work, however, provides evidence that the American public was engaged by international affairs during the 1920's and it was their active participation in the debate surrounding the Treaty that contributed to its rejection. The type of debate, which was based in part on religion and, gender prejudices, the American public generated, however, became a turn off for many Americans and undermined the movement.

In this thesis, after briefly explaining Ottoman-U.S. relations during the nineteenth century, the first chapter focuses on the Open Door policy of President William Howard Taft in 1909 and 1910. This chapter generally relies on the personal papers of Oscar Solomon Straus, the first Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. The second chapter narrates the Lausanne Treaty negotiations. It argues that the U.S.'s main agenda was to implement the Open Door policy in the Near East, especially against the imperial schema of Great Britain. Turkish nationalists

²³ In his book, *Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1931* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), the historian John D. Hicks claims that "between 1922 and 1929 the U.S. abdicated its position of world leadership, and focused its attention primarily upon domestic affairs," 49. According to Charles O. Lerche Jr., the 1920's were the "renaissance of isolationism." Lerche Jr. maintains that American people could not understand the meaning of a great-power status and they fought World War I "with emotional slogans and crusading zeal and without any rational understanding of how to approach their idealistic goal...for good or ill, Americans once again turned their backs on the world." *Foreign Policy of the American People* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), 119. The historian Arthur Link maintains that the internationalist coalition that Woodrow Wilson put together "gradually disintegrated from 1917 to 1920 and disappeared entirely during the campaign of 1920." "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" *The Historical Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (July 1959), 839.

took advantage of the tension between these great powers, and even increased it, by granting the U.S. the Chester Concession during the negotiations. The third chapter describes the public debate about the Lausanne Treaty in the U.S. between 1923 and 1927. The epilogue explains the reasons why the anti-Lausanne Treaty movement did not succeed in preventing the U.S. from officially recognizing Turkey, although it influenced the Senate to reject the Treaty.

CHAPTER I

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: U.S. OPEN DOOR POLICY IN TURKEY

Early Years

Since the early years of its establishment, the U.S. wanted to trade in the Near East.¹ Since piracy was widespread in the Eastern Mediterranean, the first U.S. official encounter in the Near East was with the Barbary Pirates. The Barbary Pirates were located in Northern Africa and politically attached to the Ottoman Empire. Countries that wanted to trade on the Eastern Mediterranean paid tribute to these pirates in return for safety. The first Turkish-American meeting took place in 1800 when Commodore William Bainbridge brought the U.S. tribute to Constantinople.² Signing an official treaty took another thirty years. The U.S. did not want to approach the Ottomans while they were at war with Napoleon's France, thus potentially putting its relations with France at risk.³

The U.S. and the Ottoman Empire eventually concluded a trade treaty in May 1830. According to this treaty, the Ottoman Empire granted the U.S. extraterritorial rights known as capitulations, which the Ottomans had already granted to the

¹ Dexter Perkins, *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*, Revised Ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 50-51.

² Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932), 7.

³ Ibid, 9.

other major European powers.¹ Leland Gordon explains capitulations as: "one state exercises certain sovereign functions within the boundaries of another state."²

The Ottomans began to grant capitulations after the capture of Constantinople from the Byzantium Empire in 1543. After this event, the Ottomans, ruled by Islamic laws, became an empire truly and had direct contact with Europe. According to the Islamic laws, only Muslims had exclusive rights for trade.³ In order to encourage foreign investment in the Empire and not contradict with the Islamic laws, the Ottoman Empire granted capitulations to Italian merchants. Thus, these merchants would be subject to their own laws rather than Ottoman laws.⁴

Until the beginning of the Great War, however, Turkish-American trade remained on a modest level although the two countries maintained friendly relations.⁵ The Ottoman Empire, for instance, was one of the rare countries that supported the Union during the Civil War.⁶ American missionary and humanitarian

¹ Ibid, 190.

² Gordon, 190.

³ Lucius Ellsworth Thayer, "The Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire and the Question of their Abrogation as it Affects the United States" *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (April 1923), 208.

⁴ Ibid, 209.

⁵ In his book, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century* (Albany: State University of New York, 1988), the historian Resat Kasaba indicates that during most of the nineteenth century Great Britain was the leading trade partner of the Ottoman Empire. The United States was the fifth trading partner after France, Austria and Russia, 87.

⁶ *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States* (Hereafter referred to as FRUS), 1862, Government Printing Office, Washington, 788. Quoted by Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930*, 12.

institutions, on the other hand, flourished rapidly during the nineteenth century.⁷ As of 1886-87 there were 419 American schools in the Near East with 16,205 students who were mainly Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, Bulgarians, and Roman Catholics – only a small number of Muslims attended these schools.⁸

The First Open Door Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire: Oscar Solomon Straus,

1909-1910

With the dawn of the twentieth century, the U.S. was emerging as an empire. A war with Spain over Cuba and Secretary Hay's Open Door notes signified this shift. Consequently, the U.S. perception of the Near East changed. The 1908 Young Turk revolution against the corrupt Abdulhamid II, and subsequent declaration of a constitutional monarchy in Turkey, convinced U.S. policy makers that this new country would be receptive to capitalism and American penetration.⁹ It was commonly believed among U.S. policy makers that because of its oil reserves, additional natural resources, and need for reconstruction; the Near East had become as important as China. This marked the beginning of a struggle between the U.S. Open Door policy and Old World (German, British, and French) imperialism in the Near East.¹⁰ U.S. policy makers believed that the Young Turks could bring stability and the rule of law to the Ottoman Empire and make it

⁷ Gordon, 221.

⁸ Oscar Solomon Straus Papers, Box 1, File: Correspondence January-April 1888, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).

⁹ Gordon, 57.

¹⁰ Ibid, 59.

available for American commercial expansion.¹¹ According to State Department dispatches of the time, the new Young Turk regime also wanted to encourage U.S. investment.¹² President Taft and Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox welcomed the opportunity to expand the American influence in the region. They were committed to maintaining Hay's Dollar Diplomacy.¹³

Born in Bavaria, Oscar Solomon Straus came to the U.S. as a child. After practicing law in New York, he was appointed as the U.S. Minister to the Ottoman Empire from 1887 to 1889, and again during the period of 1898–1901. Later, he was the Secretary of Commerce and Labor during the Theodore Roosevelt administration, 1906-1909. Afterwards, President Taft appointed him as the first ambassador to the Ottoman Empire in 1909. The next year, he resigned from this post citing private reasons. His private papers, however, indicated that his discontent with the policies of the Secretary of State, Philander Chase Knox (1853–921), was the primary reason for his resignation.

In the summer of 1908, the Young Turks, mostly military officers calling themselves the Committee of Union and Progress, instigated a revolution against the Sultan Abdulhamid II and forced him to reintroduce the 1876 constitution.¹⁴

¹¹ The New York Times (NYT), Oct. 30, 1910, "Straus Would Quit Post in Turkey."

¹² Lewis Einstein, *chargé d'affaires* to Knox, July 15, 1909, Embassy Archives, Dispatches to the State Department, July 3, 1909 to December 29, 1909, Vol. 32. RG 84, Stack Area 350, Row 10, Compartment 5, Shelf 1. United States National Archives, Washington.

¹³ Herbert F. Wright, "Philander Chase Knox" in *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*, Vol. IX, Ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, INC, 1963), 327.

¹⁴ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001), 94.

The new regime consolidated its power in April 1909 by deposing Abdulhamid II.¹⁵ The U.S. reaction to the reestablishment of the parliamentary regime was positive. The acting U.S. Ambassador, John G. A. Leishman, predicted that the decline of the Ottoman Empire would be halted by the Young Turks. He also predicted that the Ottoman Empire would become a “highly civilized and progressive nation” thanks to its natural resources.¹⁶ U.S. policy makers believed that the constitution and the parliament would help to make the country stable for commercial expansion.

In 1909, Straus' term as Secretary of Commerce and Labor expired with the Roosevelt Administration. While Straus planned to return to his law practice in New York, President Taft and Secretary Knox offered him the Constantinople post.¹⁷ Taft and Knox told him that in view of the regime changes that had occurred in the Empire, he was the most qualified man for the ambassador position.¹⁸ The epoch-making events occurring in the Turkish Empire provided challenges and opportunities, which made that post take on an even greater significance. They made it clear that the President needed his expertise and keen knowledge.¹⁹ Straus was not interested in the job as he had already worked there twice. Given

¹⁵ Ambassador Leishman to the Secretary of State, Constantinople, April 15, 1909. *FRUS, 1909* (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1914), 563.

¹⁶ Ambassador Leishman to the Secretary of State, Constantinople, September 28, 1908. *FRUS, 1908* (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1912), 749.

¹⁷ Oscar Solomon Straus, “My Third Mission to Turkey – Random Notes, the Following Letters from President Taft and Secretary Knox Explain Themselves”, an unpublished diary in Oscar Solomon Straus Papers, Box 23, Diary 1909-10, 2 (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Knox to Straus, April 29, 1909, Box 23, File: Correspondence 1909-10, Straus papers, 2.

the choice, he would have preferred to go to Japan.²⁰ When the President of the United States told him that it was his patriotic duty to accept the Constantinople post, however, Straus felt he could not decline the offer.²¹

The relationship between Ambassador Straus and Secretary Knox was troublesome. While Knox wanted to penetrate the region economically, Straus was always skeptical about the possibility for America's expansion in the Ottoman Empire without getting entangled in Old World politics.²² Knox considered the Near East as economically significant as China, but Straus strongly believed that any major American investment in the Near East meant entanglement in the Eastern Question, namely the partition of the crumbling Ottoman Empire.²³ Knox expected Straus to negotiate concessions for the building of railroads, mines and irrigation.²⁴ Straus, on the other hand, considered these ventures extremely dangerous as they would put the U.S. at odds with the major European powers as they were deeply involved with the internal politics of the country.

Ironically, at a time when the U.S. government decided to increase its economic influence and seek business opportunities overseas, the man they sent as the first full ambassador to the Ottoman Empire opposed this shift in U.S. foreign policy. Previously, Straus's responsibilities focused mostly on advocating

²⁰ President Taft to Straus, March 16, 1909, Box 12, File: Correspondence March 1909, *ibid*.

²¹ Straus, "My Third Mission to Turkey".

²² For an excellent narrative of the tension between Knox and Straus, see Naomi W. Cohen, "Ambassador Straus in Turkey, 1909-1910: A Note on Dollar Diplomacy," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (March 1959), 632-642.

²³ *Ibid*, 633.

²⁴ *Ibid*.

for the rights of American religious and philanthropic institutions, especially American schools. In his third mission to the Ottoman Empire, however, the Department expected Straus to lay the foundation for the big American capitalists' expansion into the Near East. During his short ambassadorship in the Ottoman Empire, two important matters came up. First, Straus was expected to convince the Ottoman government to allow American companies to bid for the enlargement of the Ottoman Navy on equal terms as their British counterparts. The second issue was the Chester Concession, a railway system that covered the entire Eastern Anatolia and connected it to the oil reserves of today's Iraq. This proposed railway network planned to extended from Baghdad and Mosul to both the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Straus failed to deliver what Knox wanted on both issues.

Straus' first task was to enable American companies to bid for the Ottoman navy enlargement program in early January 1910. The Ottoman Empire had lost the majority of its domain in Europe by then. The newly emerged independent states – Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia – now were on the offensive against the Sick Man of Europe, and Greece coveted the island of Crete. The Ottoman government, on the other hand, refused to relinquish Crete without a fight. However they lacked the necessary forces to defend the island. This prompted the Young Turks to move towards modernizing the Ottoman fleet.

After the Greek army entered into politics and dominated the government and parliament, it forced the king to consent to the summoning of a National Assembly

that would consist of delegates from around the country.²⁵ Crete decided to send delegates to this National Assembly, which declared the island as a part of Greece. For the Young Turkish government this move was a *casus belli*.²⁶ Bulgaria was also preparing to take advantage of the situation between Greece and the Ottoman Empire to make war upon Turkey either in conjunction with some of the Balkan powers or by uniting with Greece. Greece had recently purchased in Italy a man-of-war (armed naval vessel) of about ten thousand tons. Turkey was trying to match that by purchasing a man-of-war of comparable size and power.

On January 19, 1910, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs presented Straus with a memorandum showing the size of the ship and the strength of its armaments that the Porte desired to purchase.²⁷ The foreign minister promised Straus that American shipbuilding firms could come to Turkey to submit bids.²⁸ Straus sent a telegraph to the Department about the project. The Department replied that they could not sell naval vessels without the consent of Congress and this would require some time.²⁹ Knox asked Straus to find out if any part of the award was open to competition and if so to give effective and appropriate support to the representatives of the Ottoman-Anglo-American Company and those of such other reputable American firms as may wish to enter the competition.³⁰

²⁵ Straus, "My Third Mission to Turkey," 40.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Straus to the Secretary of State, April 7, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, *ibid*, 3.

²⁹ Straus, "My Third Mission to Turkey," 41.

³⁰ Straus to the Secretary of State, April 12, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, *ibid*.

Several companies, including the Ottoman-Anglo-American Company, Bethlehem Steel, and a few shipbuilding companies, were already interested in the project.

In April, the Ottoman Cabinet decided in favor of a naval program involving an annual expenditure of two million five hundred thousand dollars for a period of eight years and providing for the construction of two battleships, three cruisers and ten destroyers.³¹ This project was to be undertaken by British firms. Straus knew that due to British political pressure, the Ottomans could not wait for the Americans to get involved.³² The Minister of Marine told Straus that in order not to embarrass the other powers they did not want to open the order to competition.³³ He assured Straus, however, that if the British bid fell through the U.S. was next in line for consideration.³⁴ This *fait accompli*, according to Secretary Knox, became an embarrassment for the American interests in the region. Furthermore, Knox accused Straus of lack of deliberation and care in furthering U.S. commercial interests in the region. Straus also was angered by the commercial companies that blamed either the Department or him for the failure of the Ottoman government to follow up on its promises.³⁵

In early March 1910, Straus was preparing to board the Embassy stationary, the old and slow U.S.S. Scorpion.³⁶ His first stop was going to be Athens to meet

³¹ Ibid, 2.

³² Ibid, 5.

³³ Ibid, 2.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid, 3.

³⁶ Straus, "My Third Mission to Turkey," 53.

his brother and his wife. Being fascinated by historical monuments, he could not wait to visit the Greek ruins.³⁷ Afterwards, Straus's plan was to meet Theodore Roosevelt in Egypt at the end of his Africa trip. Straus had an overwhelming respect for Roosevelt. Through the years they remained close family friends. He was looking forward to exploring the Pyramids together and hearing Roosevelt's many fascinating African hunting adventure stories. A long cable from the State Department upset his plans.

The State Department indicated that they were unaware of Straus' vacation schedule. At a time when the U.S. interests were seeking important concessions in the Ottoman Empire, it was not advisable for him to depart. He wired back to the State Department indicating that there was nothing else he could do as far as the enlargement of the Ottoman Navy issue was concerned. He believed that the decision making process would take several weeks if not months. Furthermore, he was uncomfortable by the extreme desire to push commercial enterprises with more energy than understanding on the part of the State Department. Annoyed by Straus' attitude, Knox told him to continue his trip to Egypt to meet Roosevelt, but expedite his return.³⁸ When he returned from Egypt in early April, there was a telegram from Knox waiting on his desk. Straus could almost hear Knox's scolding voice when he read the telegram. According to Knox, Straus was wrong when he told the Department that the Porte would give several weeks postponement to

³⁷ Ibid, 55.

³⁸ Ibid, 56.

receive bids from American ship builders for the construction of several war vessels.³⁹

The second issue Straus devoted much of his time to in Constantinople was later to be known as the Chester Concessions. Through its local representatives, Mr. Colby M. Chester and Mr. Colt, the American Development Company sought a railway concession in Asia Minor. On March 6, 1910 at a dinner in the Dolmabahce Palace, Halajian Efendi, the Minister of Public Works, informed Straus that he had concluded negotiations in regard to the railway concession with the American group.⁴⁰ Halajian Efendi was anxious to bring American capital into Turkey.⁴¹

This railway concession worried Straus about the strategy the U.S. was developing in the region. During his visit in Turkey in 1898, the German Emperor obtained a concession for building the Baghdad Railway.⁴² Presently the railway reached the city of Konya in central Anatolia and the Germans expected to expand it to Basra in the Persian Gulf.⁴³ Since the Gulf region was England's sphere of influence, Straus projected that there would be a crisis in the region within a few years. By gaining the Chester Concession, the U.S. would get drawn into this on coming train wreck, as it would directly clash with the preexisting German projects in the region and interfere with their railway monopolies.⁴⁴ A crisis with the German

³⁹ Ibid, 74.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 52.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid, 10.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Straus to the Secretary, August 4, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 2.

Empire was the last thing the U.S. should have looked for. The American Ambassador in Berlin informed Straus that Germany was uneasy about the Ottoman-American Development Company's railway concession in Asia Minor.⁴⁵ Straus later learned that the German Ambassador in Constantinople informed the Ottoman government that Germany opposed the granting of the American concession.⁴⁶

Straus believed that the political and commercial interests of foreign states were closely allied in the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁷ Great powers, such as Germany, France, and England, had the purpose of furthering their political interests, and they leveraged their political interests to push their commercial interests.⁴⁸ Big scale commercial interests, according to Straus, would need the strong and consistent arm of the government for protection against unjust treatment.⁴⁹ This, in turn, would draw the U.S. into the political muddle of the "Eastern Question," either on the side of Turkey or on the side of England or Germany.⁵⁰ By pushing Dollar Diplomacy in the region, the Department was intermixing in Ottoman affairs, which

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 4.

⁴⁸ Straus, "My Third Mission to Turkey," 74.

⁴⁹ Straus to the Secretary, August 4, 1910, Box 12, File: Correspondence 1910, ibid, 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 5.

would lead the U.S. to disastrous international entanglements.⁵¹ In early August, Straus decided to face Knox directly, discuss his views, and then resign.⁵²

Straus visited Knox in late October 1910 and told him that he did not want to return to Constantinople. He also cautioned Knox that large concessions would cause possible political entanglements in the region.⁵³ He explained to Knox that the concession for the railroad should be obtained only with the backing of the U.S. government in cooperation with the European powers.⁵⁴ Knox responded that since the Chester Concession had already progressed thus far, the U.S. should continue to press for its conclusion. But if the Ottoman-American Development Company backed out, the U.S. government should determine its policy so that it would stay out of political entanglements.⁵⁵ When Straus left Knox's office, he felt an instant relief and believed that he finally made his case in opposition to the "paramount policy of eager desire of the administration to make a great showing of advancing commercial interests regardless of consequences."⁵⁶

That same day he met with President Taft. Straus honestly confessed to the President that he found working in Turkey discouraging because of the relationship between concessions and politics.⁵⁷ He continued drawing a distinction between

⁵¹ Straus, "My Third Mission to Turkey," 74-75.

⁵² Ibid, 75.

⁵³ Ibid, 135.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 139.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 140.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 141.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 136.

the necessary foreign policy in Central and South America and the Far East where U.S. commercial and political interests complemented one another, versus in the Ottoman Empire where the U.S. had no political interests. While Straus did not foresee any potential clash of interests in these other regions with the European powers, he believed that the Near East was going to be the cause of a general European war.⁵⁸ According to him, the U.S. involvement in the Eastern Question indicated a serious departure from traditional U.S. foreign policy.⁵⁹

A *New York Times* article summed up the differences between Secretary Knox and Straus: Knox wanted to push for economic expansion rapidly without regard to potential political consequences. Straus, on the other hand, wanted to proceed with aggressive economic expansion only when it was diplomatically possible.⁶⁰ Straus was never against international business. He believed that they were living in an age of international commerce, and the people of the U.S. were in the forefront, "both in the reward they reap and in the prosperity they enjoy."⁶¹ According to Straus, international commerce could bring international peace for the first time in human history. Commerce in its modern development was based upon mutuality, and every ship that carried its products to foreign countries was a messenger of peace and good will.⁶² If peace and American ethical standards

⁵⁸ Ibid, 138.

⁵⁹ Ibid, 99.

⁶⁰ The New York Times, October 30, 1910, "Straus Would Quit Post in Turkey."

⁶¹ Address as Secretary of Commerce and Labor at the Anniversary Celebration of the Savannah Board of Trade, April 3, 1908, published by the Government Printing Office, 1908, found at Straus Papers, Box 23, Diary 1908-1909, 6.

⁶² Ibid, 7.

were not maintained in international commerce, however, the U.S. was on the way to becoming a “degenerate” country.⁶³ Straus devoted the rest of his career at the Permanent Court of Arbitration to attain diplomatic harmony among nations.

After Straus resigned in 1910, the Ottoman Empire stumbled from one war to another over the next ten years. Due to the instability in the region and the U.S.’s entrance into the Great War, American policy makers paused their pursuit of an aggressive Open Door policy. In 1919, led by the new U.S. High Commissioner to the Ottoman Empire, Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, the U.S. renewed its Open Door policy effort at a new and unprecedented level.

The late government official and diplomatic historian Herbert Feis (1893-1972) called the 1920’s the decade when Dollar Diplomacy was prevalent.⁶⁴ His assessment describes U.S. activities in the Near East for the first half of the 1920’s when there was a consensus among policy makers and the business class that American capital should go to wherever it was needed and there was a potential for profit. After the U.S. signed the Lausanne Treaty with Turkey in 1923, however, there was a significant minority opinion in the U.S. that policy makers acted immorally in order to maintain an Open Door policy in the Near East. The next chapter illustrates the U.S. Open Door policy during the early 1920’s, and demonstrates the origins of the opposition to Open Door policy.

⁶³ His Address, as Secretary of Commerce and Labor, at the Annual Banquet of the Traffic Club of Philadelphia, The Union League, PA, February 27, 1909 (Washington: Government Printing Office 1909), *ibid*, 5.

⁶⁴ Herbert Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era 1919-1932* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965), v.

CHAPTER II

KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN AT LAUSANNE CONFERENCE

The U.S. Open Door Policy in the Near East during 1920's

Unlike previous wars, nations waged the Great War by relying on tanks and airplanes. Towards the end of the War, it became clear that an increasingly important component of a nation's strength depended upon its oil reserves and steel production capacity. Hoping to maintain its imperial power after the War, Britain coveted the oil reserves of the Near East as its victory price. The United States, meanwhile, proved that it had become perhaps the most powerful nation both economically and militarily by 1920. The U.S. also recognized the importance of the Near Eastern oil reserves for its future. During their peace negotiations with the remnants of the Ottoman Empire first, and later the successor Turkey, the U.S. strove to keep the region open to all investors regardless of their nationalities. Britain, on the other hand, sought sole control of the Mesopotamian oil reserves in today's Iraq.

After the Great War, a triumphant Woodrow Wilson envisioned a League of Nations under the leadership of the U.S. that would replace the Balance of Power diplomacy that previously guided international relations prior to the war. Wilson believed that the League of Nations would provide an environment in which all countries were obliged to conduct their foreign relations peacefully through open

dialogue and negotiation. He insisted that the 1920 presidential election was going to be a referendum on this new world order, which the Senate had rejected in 1919.¹ His opponent, Warren Harding, promised to take the American people back to “normalcy.”² Harding trusted that many Americans did not want the U.S. to get involved with the world’s political affairs too closely. His election motto was to roll back the Wilsonian era to the true nature of U.S. diplomacy that detested entangling alliances. According to historian Charles Lerche Jr., the American people fought the Great War with a “crusading zeal” without understanding “the meaning of great-power status.” This confusion, Lerche concludes, led the American people to reject Wilson’s world-community vision.³

Two interrelated beliefs influenced U.S. foreign policy during the 1920’s: fear of the collapse of the world economy, and distrust of politicians and bureaucrats who failed to prevent the Great War. American policy makers and businessmen assumed that the U.S. could not maintain its wealth when the major customer nations could not buy American industrial and agricultural products. The conviction that U.S. wealth depended upon a stable world economy led policy makers to encourage American businessmen to invest overseas. Thus, policy makers and the business class believed that in order to open new frontiers for American businesses, the U.S. needed to invest in war-damaged nations so that they would

¹ Robert K. Murray, *The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 44-45.

² L. Ethan Ellis, *Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-1933* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1968), 4.

³ Charles O. Lerche Jr., *Foreign Policy of the American People* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961), 119.

generate their own wealth. In his book, historian Michael J. Hogan described this consensus between the policy makers and American businesses as an “Informal Entente.”⁴ According to Hogan, both parties would take “cooperative action” in order to “achieve peace and prosperity.” In this cooperation, Hogan maintains, U.S. administrations during the 1920’s protected private interests abroad.⁵ Another historian, Herbert Feis, concurs and claims that as a result the Harding, the Coolidge and Hoover administrations actively encouraged foreign investment.⁶

After an interregnum period during which the Wilson administration based its foreign policy on internationalism and moral leadership, the U.S. returned to the Open Door policy after the election of Warren Harding. Once again, Philander Chase Knox’s style of commerce-based diplomacy became fashionable, although it met with occasional setbacks. In the case of relations with Turkey, the opposition to the Open Door policy was overwhelming because it unified different sections of U.S. society. These sections consisted of church leaders and their followers, Wilsonian politicians some of whom were opportunists, and those who categorically rejected establishing relations with Muslims. This opposition to the Open Door policy differed philosophically from Straus’s more than a decade earlier. In his time, Straus had disapproved the Open Door policy because it paid no attention to the traditional balance of power in the Near East and potentially positioned the U.S. in opposition to the European powers. Straus was not against

⁴ Michael J. Hogan, *Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977).

⁵ Ibid, 1.

⁶ Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar*, 5-6.

the idea of free trade nor dealing with Muslims. Straus clashed with Knox because he believed Knox's foreign policy to be unnecessarily confrontational. As a pragmatic diplomat, Straus concluded that the profit the U.S. may earn in the Near East would be less than the risk it took by agitating Britain and Germany. During the twenties, however, as the following pages will demonstrate, the opponents of the Open Door policy in the Turkish case were predominantly Wilsonian—moralistic and idealistic. They claimed that the Open Door policy was immoral and damaged U.S. honor.

In early 1920's, it was a common belief among policy makers and businessmen that the American market would not be sufficient for American producers in the near future. That was why it was important to look for new markets. In addition, many American businessmen were convinced that they could conduct more peaceful international relations than politicians and diplomats.⁷ After all, these politicians and diplomats were responsible for the most destructive war in history. The American business class welcomed the opportunity to use their surplus money and manufacturing goods around the world. In their second World Congress at Rome in 1923, for instance, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) declared that businessmen from all nations would maintain the peace rather than the "ignorant and impractical politicians and bureaucrats."⁸

⁷ In his book, *The Age of Roosevelt: The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. claims that after the war there was "an age of business" when "an economic success and metaphysics of optimism" were predominant, 71.

⁸ Julian Gillespie to Bristol, June 4, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June 1-31 1923, Mark Lambert Bristol Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).

At the conference, the ICC adopted a resolution that accused the Old World regimes of failing catastrophically by causing the Great War and dragging humanity into the biggest tragedy.⁹ According to the resolution, businessmen did not have a political agenda – they worked for the enhancement of profit and that was good for the masses. Fred I. Kent, Vice President of Bankers Trust Company of New York, said that “the impracticable, the ignorant and the vicious” political leaders caused misery and disasters for the masses. The time, he asserted, had come for businessmen to stop this destructive system.¹⁰ With its resources, namely oil, and the potential to be a new market place, the Near East was one of the destinations on which the ICC focused.

That same year, the ICC published the “Report of the Present Situation in Turkey December 1922.”¹¹ This report was based largely on contacts made through American officials of the State Department and the courtesy of the American Chamber of Commerce for the Levant. According to this report, although industries were non-existent in Turkey, the country was rich with mineral wealth such as gold, silver, lead, copper, iron, coal and oil.¹² The oil fields of Mosul discovered by the Germans, the report claimed, had become one of the biggest victory prizes for the Allied forces. Additionally, the copper deposits in eastern Anatolia were reputed to be among the richest in the world. The report concluded

⁹ Julian Gillespie to Bristol, June 4, 1923, *ibid*.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 7.

¹¹ Bristol to Basil Miles at Rome, International Chamber of Commerce, March 12, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence March, 1-31, 1923, *ibid*.

¹² *Ibid*, 9.

that the Asiatic possessions of Turkey constituted a promising market for the products of industrial Europe and America.¹³ Although American capital was welcome almost anywhere in the world, the U.S. struggled to have a foothold in the Near Eastern oil reserves because of the British dominant imperial presence in the region.¹⁴

Under the leadership of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, Britain built a division of fast battleships fed by oil between 1911 and 1914.¹⁵ After this transition in its navy, having steady access to oil supplies became a national policy for Britain. The Great War reemphasized the importance of oil for the industrialized countries.¹⁶ Towards the end of the Great War, the British government declared that it was going to be their fixed policy to keep aliens out of oil properties both in the British dominions and in foreign neutral countries.¹⁷

The U.S. Navy also converted their ships from coal burners to oil burners before the war.¹⁸ Since the U.S. was using the reserves within its own borders and in Mexico until the end of the War, American policy makers did not need a concrete foreign oil supply policy until the end of the Great War.¹⁹ The U.S.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar*, 48.

¹⁵ John A. DeNovo, "Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 41, No. 4. (March 1955), 654.

¹⁶ Ibid, 656.

¹⁷ DeNovo, "The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920" *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (July, 1956), 860.

¹⁸ DeNovo, "Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I," 641.

¹⁹ Ibid.

appreciated the significance of oil not only as an indispensable fuel but also as a lubricant after its wartime experience.²⁰ At the end of the war, oil experts concluded that the U.S. had only thirty years worth of oil reserves.²¹ The oil industry and government officials now considered that the national interests were in serious jeopardy due to the depletion of domestic petroleum reserves and British inroads into the remaining promising oil fields of the world, particularly those of Asia Minor.²² U.S. oil companies realized that by 1919 the British companies, which were currently turning out less than five per cent of the world's production, had acquired more than half the world's estimated future reserves, mostly through the Turkish Petroleum Company.²³ Although the U.S. declared that it did not have any expansionist ambitions before the war, the U.S. government advocated for the Open Door principle, which would give equal access to all powers and forbid any exclusive rights in the Middle East after the war.²⁴ Britain, on the other hand, viewed the Near Eastern resources as its ultimate Great War victory prize.

In 1914, Britain, Germany and the Netherlands had agreed to share the oil reserves of the Near East by establishing the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) – half owned by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (British), a quarter by Dutch Shell, and a quarter by a German company. The TPC obtained the exclusive rights to

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ DeNovo, "The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 1918-1920," 857.

²² Ibid, 874.

²³ Ibid, 865.

²⁴ Edward Mead Earl, "The Turkish Petroleum Company – A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy" *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Jun., 1924), 265.

exploit the vast oil deposits of Mosul and Baghdad from the Ottoman government the same year.²⁵ After the war, the German shares in the company were nullified, and an Anglo-French-Dutch monopoly was created in mandated Iraq.²⁶

In April 1920, Britain and France came together in San Remo, Italy to conclude the partition of the previously Ottoman-ruled areas. At the conference, France took over the German shares of TPC, and Britain and France established complete authority over the Mesopotamian oil fields.²⁷ Britain planned to establish a pipe line from Mesopotamia through Syria (then under French mandate) to the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁸ The San Remo Treaty, according to the U.S. government, ran counter to their Open Door policy. The U.S. Secretary of State, Bainbridge Colby, protested the San Remo agreement on the grounds that the mandated areas were to be administered and kept open to all the nations.²⁹ Colby further indicated that Near Eastern oil "interested public opinion in the U.S. as a potential subject of international strife."³⁰

²⁵ Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar*, 50-51.

²⁶ Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, Vol. II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 572.

²⁷ Earl, "The Turkish Petroleum Company," 273.

²⁸ Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar*, 51.

²⁹ Edward Mead Earl, "The Turkish Petroleum Company," 274.

³⁰ Mr. Colby to Lord Curzon, November 20, 1920: "Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the United States Ambassador respecting Economic Rights in Mandated Territories," Parliamentary Papers. Command, 675, 1921. Cited by Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar*, 52.

American oil companies were also interested in investing in the region.³¹

During the early 1920's, U.S. policy makers and American businesses, especially the Standard Oil Company, pursued an aggressive Open Door policy in the Near East. Unlike the reluctant Open Door diplomat Oscar Solomon Straus, this time the U.S. had an ideally suited representative in the region. During his tenure in Turkey between 1919 and 1927, Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol devoted his time to protecting U.S. commercial interests by combating the Allied's attempt to colonize the region and negotiating concessions with the Turkish government.

Mark Lambert Bristol: An Open Door Diplomat in Constantinople

The Wilson administration assigned Admiral Mark Bristol as the High Commissioner to Constantinople to protect U.S. institutions and interests in the Allied-occupied Near East in August 1919. Earlier Bristol served with distinction as commander of a naval ship in European waters.³² He was also a member of the International Armistice Commission in Belgium in November 1918.³³ Bristol made opening the door for the Standard Oil Company his top priority by revitalizing the earlier Chester Concession.³⁴ The Standard Oil Company supported the Chester Concession partly because one of the railway concessions included the rights to

³¹ Benjamin Gerig, *The Open Door and The Mandates System: A Study of Economic Equality Before and Since the Establishment of the Mandate System* (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD., 1930), 141.

³² Dr. C. F. Gates, President of Robert College, Constantinople, "The Departure of Admiral Bristol," *The Levant Trade Review*, May 1927, Vol. XV, No. 5, 183, found at Box 91, Album-News Clippings, Bristol Papers.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Bristol to Secretary of State Sept. 7, 1921, Box 72 File: Ottoman Empire - Commercial Jan-Dec.1921, ibid.

exploit the underground resources of the region, especially Mosul's oil fields. It did not want to abandon this source of wealth to the British Turkish Petroleum Company.³⁵

Bristol was a quintessential Open Door diplomat of his time. He believed that current foreign policy should be governed by financial and commercial considerations, and the future reconstruction of the world should be based upon advice from financial and commercial circles. Bristol believed that the U.S. could assist underdeveloped countries by helping them to create strong economies. He was convinced that political problems would be resolved if people rallied around quality of life issues as opposed to ideological or nationalist ones.³⁶ He was convinced that it was the U.S.'s obligation to help the Turks establish their new government and new laws.³⁷

Bristol believed that during the war and its aftermath, the religious and sentimental conduct of foreign affairs masked the real issues. According to Bristol, idealistic and moralistic goals were accomplished most effectively by practical means, such as fixing the economic problems of nations.³⁸ He was convinced that Dollar Diplomacy would result in peace among nations and would help the U.S. to find markets for its surplus products. The Admiral thought that the U.S. should take

³⁵ Miller Joblin, General Manager of Standard Oil Company of NY to Bristol, November 29, 1922, Box 38 File: Correspondence Nov. 1- 30 1922, Bristol Papers.

³⁶ Bristol to A.W. Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 1-31 1923, *ibid*, 9.

³⁷ Bristol to Basil Miles at Rome, International Chamber of Commerce, March 12, 1923, *ibid*, 4.

³⁸ Bristol to Allen W. Dulles, Dept of State, January 19, 1923, Box 38, File: Correspondence Dec. 1-29 1922, *ibid*, 6.

part in the solution of the economic problems of the world and it should start in the Near East by providing "assistance, advice and sympathy."³⁹ Bristol believed just as strongly that the U.S. needed to have foreign markets to absorb its surplus production of all kinds.⁴⁰ In the near future, U.S. production capacity would exceed demand. Therefore, the U.S. should begin to look for new markets because "in a very few years the old European countries that were knocked out by the Great War would be back on their feet" and demand their share.⁴¹ Britain was already demanding the resources of the Near East for itself.

In 1919 when Bristol arrived in Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, it had been under Allied occupation for almost a year. It took the Allied governments another year to make a peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire because their first priority was to deal with Germany. The Allied governments and the Ottoman Empire finally signed the Sevres Treaty near Paris in the summer of 1920, which certified the British mandate over Iraq and Palestine, French dominance in Syria and Lebanon, and Greek control of western Asia Minor and Thrace. Several islands including Rhodes on the Aegean Sea were given to Italy; Armenians and the Kurds were slated to have a national land in Eastern Anatolia; and the Turks would have a small national land in central Anatolia. Although the Ottoman government signed the treaty, a Turkish nationalist movement was growing rapidly against the occupation of Asia Minor by Greece.

³⁹ Bristol to T.C. Perkins, Perkins and Company, January 25, 1924, Box 41 File: Correspondence Dec. 15-31 1923, *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Bristol to Julius H. Barnes, President of the Chamber of Commerce, October 30, 1923, Box 40, File: Correspondence July 1-31 1923, *ibid.*, 3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

In May 1919, Greek forces crossed the Aegean Sea and occupied Smyrna. This occupation and their movement towards central Anatolia caused an uproar among many Turks. During the next two years, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), the Turks rejected the terms of the Sevres Treaty and fought a successful war against Greek occupation. Thus, in early 1921, there were two governments, the Ottoman government in Constantinople and the Turkish nationalist government in Angora. Sensing the strength and possible success of the Angora government, the American High Commission decided to open negotiations with them. In fact, the Russian, French and Italian governments already had diplomatic relations with the nationalists. The French and Italians were trading with the nationalists through the cities of Samsun and Trabzon on the Black Sea region.⁴² In need of money and legitimacy, the nationalists welcomed relations with the U.S. and wanted American companies to invest in the region.

The U.S. High Commission and the Angora government began to communicate in early 1921. Julian Gillespie, the U.S. Commercial Attaché, helped Bristol to identify investment opportunities and revitalize the Chester Concession. Late in March, C. K. Streit, journalist from the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, returned from a visit to the Angora government and informed Gillespie that Mustapha Kemal Pasha and other high officials of the nationalist

⁴² Julian Gillespie to the Director of the Department of Commerce, MacElwee, 31 March 1921, Constantinople. RG 151 Records of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, General Records, 1914 – 1958. Trade Promotion Europe, Near East, Canada, & Alaska 448, Russia (Trade w/U.S, 1939-Vanderlip)-449, Near East (Arabia) (Hereafter referred to as RG 151) Box No. 1990. Entry 1. (RG 151, Stack Area 570, Row 52, Compartment 23, Shelf 07, United States National Archives, College Park). Folder: Turkey – Discrimination Against American Interests.

government wanted a commercial representative of the American government to come to Angora.⁴³ The nationalists needed agricultural machinery, automobiles, trucks and railroad equipment in Anatolia. They preferred U.S. investment because they believed that unlike Britain, the U.S. had no political ambitions for the region. In another instance, Robert McDowell, an American relief worker at Samsun, informed Admiral Bristol that officials of the Angora government repeatedly requested that a U.S. commercial delegate be sent to Angora to talk over possible business relations.⁴⁴

Gillespie suggested to the Department of Commerce that an official trip to Anatolia would be beneficial to U.S. interests. He proposed to secure information concerning construction of railway lines – the Chester Concession – that would connect major Anatolian cities. Gillespie was also interested in finding out the extent of agricultural machinery needs in Anatolia, as well as discovering other materials for import such as tobacco, opium, wool and mohair.⁴⁵ From late December 1921 to early January 1922, Gillespie spent time in and around Angora making inquiries concerning the economic situation, transportation facilities, mines and ports of Anatolia with a view to interesting American capital investment.⁴⁶ At the end, he was convinced that there were many opportunities for American businesses investment. The Angora government officials welcomed

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ *Bosphore*, Dec. 29, 1921, RG 151, *ibid*.

Gillespie's assessment and promised to assist American capitalists.⁴⁷ Mustafa Kemal Pasha told Gillespie that he would be pleased to see American capital participate in the task of recreating Anatolia.⁴⁸

Gillespie informed Bristol that the Turks were going to fight till the end to regain the national pact territories.⁴⁹ He reported that the Turks seemed to be tolerant towards Christians but there was an antagonism to the interference of religion in politics, whether Christian or Muslim. They did not have Bolshevik inclinations and fully realized that both their religious and economic organization precluded Bolshevism. They were eager to give America options on certain construction work and natural resources in order to prevent monopolization of the European Powers through the peace treaty. There was a disposition to revive the Chester Concession and a willingness to discuss American participation in the exploitation of Kurdistan's oil.⁵⁰

Admiral Bristol played a major role in obtaining the concession.⁵¹ He believed that such a business venture would permit the U.S. to legitimately influence European political affairs without the U.S. government's entering into any entangling alliances.⁵² The State Department gave a green light to Bristol to

⁴⁷ *Aksam*, January 4, 1922, *ibid*.

⁴⁸ *Le Reveils* January 2, 1922, *ibid*.

⁴⁹ Bristol to Secretary of State, Feb. 21, 1922, Box 77 File: Turkey-Commercial 1922, Bristol Papers.

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 2.

⁵¹ Bristol to A.W. Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 1-31 1923), *ibid*, 5.

⁵² *Ibid*, 8.

support the Chester Concession. In a telegram dated 1922, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes asked Bristol to keep the Department informed about the status of the Chester negotiations with the Angora government, with a special reference to territory covered and modifications of any original projects.⁵³ Around the same time, Admiral Bristol provided Arthur Chester, the son of the man who obtained the original concession in 1909, with an official letter so that he could travel around Anatolia freely and sign a concession deal with the Angora government.⁵⁴ Turkish officials promised that they would seek to pass the concession in the Parliament.

While Bristol was attending the first Lausanne conference in 1922, Arthur Chester sent him a letter and requested that the U.S. support the Chesters' claims in Mosul. Chester explained that the Turks hoped to harm the British claims in the region by encouraging American investment in Mosul.⁵⁵ Chester further explained that according to his father, Mosul was not a part of Mesopotamia. Since it was east of the Tigris River, it was not included in the English mandate, and therefore it was legally an integral part of Turkey.⁵⁶ Chester concluded that U.S. government support would have great bearing on the value of the concession.⁵⁷ Bristol and the State Department heard this request and crafted their Lausanne strategy around supporting the Chester Concession.

⁵³ Hughes to Bristol, November 29, 1922, Box 77 File: Turkey-Commercial 1922, *ibid*.

⁵⁴ U.S. High Commission Office at Constantinople to Bristol at Lausanne, November 29, 1922, Box 69 File: Lausanne Conference 1922. On this document, Chester requests another support letter similar to one he received from Bristol in August 1921, *ibid*.

⁵⁵ Arthur Chester to Bristol October 22, 1922, Box 41 File: Correspondence Oct. 13-31 1923, *ibid*.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 2.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*.

First Conference

At the end of 1922, the Greek army in Asia Minor was crushed by the Turkish nationalists. The Allied powers accepted the fact that they could not impose the Sevres Treaty upon the Turks anymore. In order to resolve the Eastern question once and for all, the Allied governments and the countries around Turkey sent their finest diplomats to the Alpine city of Lausanne in Switzerland in November 1922. They wanted to pressure the Turks into signing a treaty that would allow them to establish their own semi-autonomous country. The Allied powers wanted Turkey to pay for war reparations as well as to maintain the capitulations. They hoped that the new Turkish nationalist government would sign a watered down version of the Sevres Treaty. Having just beaten the Greeks on the battle field and consolidated their power in Anatolia, however, the Turks came to Lausanne self-confident and with a desire to have complete independence. The Turks believed that they held enough cards to abolish the capitulations and gain as much territory as possible.

The U.S. government decided to attend the Lausanne Conference just as an observer. Although they joined the Great War on different sides, the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. never officially declared war on each other. Therefore, the U.S. policy makers did not think it was necessary for the U.S. to officially make peace with the Turks. When the U.S. entered the Great War on the side of the Allied powers in 1917, the Ottoman Empire severed its relations with the U.S. and denounced the capitulations as the basis of their relations.⁵⁸ The U.S.'s objective

⁵⁸ Edward W. Turlington, "The American Treaty of Lausanne" *World Peace Foundation Pamphlets* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1934), 565.

at Lausanne was to re-establish pre-war relations with the Turkish government – maintain the capitulations, prevent the Allies from establishing spheres of influence in the Near East, and protect the newly emerging Chester Concession.

It was additionally important to the Department of Commerce that the U.S. should be represented at Lausanne because the present occupation regime excluded the Americans and prevented them from investing freely in the region. The entire U.S. standing in this part of the world, the commercial attaché Paul Edwards maintained, could be injured. According to Edwards, Turkey was a gateway to the Danube countries, Southern Russia, Transcaucasia, Turkistan, Persia and Anatolia, and “any discussion of a revision of the Sevres Treaty also raised the question of the status of territorial disposition of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia.”⁵⁹

The U.S. was represented by three diplomats: Mark Bristol, Richard Washburn Child, Ambassador to Italy, and Joseph Grew, Ambassador to Switzerland. In his diary, Grew confided that the chief obstacles were going to be capitulations, financial clauses, and Mosul.⁶⁰ Child, head of the U.S. delegation, talked to the Turkish delegate to discover the Turkish strategy. The Turks indicated that they did not want mandates, zones of influence, secret clauses, or a territorial home for Armenians or other minorities. The Turks wanted American development equal to or exceeding participation of any other nation in the Mosul

⁵⁹ U.S. High Commission at Constantinople to Director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce 11 February, 1922, RG 151, 7.

⁶⁰ Joseph Grew Diary, January 3, 1923, an unpublished diary, No. 22, Joseph Grew Papers, (Houghton Library, Harvard College Library), 3.

oil fields. They expressed full willingness to protect American philanthropic, educational and religious organizations.⁶¹ Throughout the first and second conferences, the Turks tried to conclude a separate treaty with the U.S. in order to have bargaining chips against Britain and France.⁶²

One of the attendees of the opening ceremony was Benito Mussolini, the newly elected Prime Minister of Italy. In his meeting with Child and Grew, Mussolini opined that the French and British had different agenda. He thought that the Turks were absolutely stubborn and predicted an early break-down of the conference.⁶³ Mussolini's forecast turned out to be true.

The conference began with a welcome speech from Robert Haab, the President of the Swiss Confederation. Then Lord Curzon, the Chairman of the conference from Britain, made a speech and explained the structure of the meeting. No other speeches were planned, but Ismet Pasha, the head of the Turkish delegation, arose and made a speech "controversial and threatening in tone."⁶⁴ In the speech, Ismet blamed the Western powers for all the misery that Near Eastern peoples had to endure.⁶⁵ Grew looked at Mussolini's face at that moment and Mussolini appeared as if he was about to lunge at Ismet's throat.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Ibid, November 22, 1922, *ibid*, 161.

⁶² Ibid, November 29, 1922, *ibid*, 175.

⁶³ Grew, November 20, 1922 (unpublished diary), Grew Papers, 154.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923. Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace*, Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty (London: Majesty's Stationary Office, 1923).

⁶⁶ Grew, November 20, 1922, Diary, Grew Papers, 154.

Ismet Pasha was not a diplomat. He came to Lausanne because Mustafa Kemal trusted him most. Although Ismet was not the ablest negotiator, Mustafa Kemal knew him to be neither a Bolshevik nor an Anglophile. In addition to his lack of diplomatic skills, Ismet was almost completely deaf. His secretary sat beside him and took notes so that Ismet could read them as they were written. That was why there was always a delay in the Turkish delegate's response to the discussed issues. The other delegates found this delay nothing but irritating.⁶⁷ Grew did not have a high opinion of Ismet's intelligence, especially since he was a soldier.⁶⁸ Ismet, however, would play a crucial role in the creation of an independent Turkey by sometimes playing the role of a clueless deaf man, sometimes a victorious general, and sometimes a drinking buddy of Grew and Child.

Early in the conference, Child declared to the Allied diplomats that the U.S. was against any type of special privileges in the Near East. This statement, Grew described, had "a bombshell effect." The Allied representatives realized that the U.S. was going to press for open access in the region. It was clear to them, especially Britain, that the rationale behind this statement was oil.⁶⁹ Later, journalists asked Grew if Child's speech would be interpreted as the U.S. interfering in European affairs, but Grew rejected this idea.⁷⁰ Child later made a speech to the delegates and said that the U.S. was here to protect U.S. interests: commercial, humane and financial. In that speech, Child indicated that the U.S. did

⁶⁷ Ibid, November 24, 1922, *ibid*, 170.

⁶⁸ Ibid, February 4, 1923, *ibid*, 60.

⁶⁹ Ibid, November 25, 1922, *ibid*, 171.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

not seek “special privilege or favor” – just an “open door” for all powers in the Near East, freedom of the straits and the Black Sea, and the safety of the minority populations.⁷¹

At a sub-committee meeting, Italian and British delegates spoke in favor of an Armenian state in eastern Anatolia on January 6.⁷² Riza Nur, the second man in the Turkish delegation, interrupted the speech and left the committee room. The Allied representatives protested against this action of the Turks.⁷³ This was an early indication that it was not going to be easy or even possible to formulate any concrete plan for minority independence peacefully.⁷⁴ The Armenian homeland issue was not raised again seriously after this stand off. At the other sub committee meetings, Turks rejected every Allied attempt to limit the new republic's sovereignty. It became clear that the Allied diplomats could not make a satisfactory agreement with the Turks regarding capitulations, debt control, and the status of minorities.⁷⁵

During the conference, the Turkish and the American delegates were friendly towards each other. For instance, the Turks gave a dinner party at the hotel in which they were staying. Afterwards, Ismet refused to let Grew and Child depart.

⁷¹ Ibid, January 31, 1923, *ibid*, 43.

⁷² In his telegram to the Turkish Prime Minister three weeks earlier, Ismet indicated that Britain and France planned to advocate for an Armenian homeland. Thus, Ismet believed, they wanted to use the Armenian state issue as a bargaining chip to keep the Turks in check in their quest for Mosul. Bilal N. Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari: Turk Diplomatic Belgelerinde Lozan Baris Conferansi*, Vol. I (Ankara: Turkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1990), 167.

⁷³ Grew, January 6, 1923, Grew Papers, 5.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 7.

⁷⁵ Ibid, January 8, 1923, *ibid*, 7-8.

All three of them instead went to a private room and Ismet drank so fast that Grew was stunned. Grew and Child promised that they would take Ismet to the U.S. and show him Niagara Falls, the Grand Canyon and the White House if he signed two treaties — one with the Allies and one with the U.S.⁷⁶ The U.S. delegates reciprocated by arranging an official dinner for the Turks. The Turks said they were happy with the U.S. attitude in general, although they were disappointed by the U.S. support for an Armenian national home. They appreciated, however, that the U.S. had to take this stand because of the American public's support for the Christian minorities in Turkey.⁷⁷ It was the Turks' struggle with Britain for Mosul during the conference that brought the countries together.

At the conference, Ismet claimed Mosul for the Turks because it belonged to the Ottoman Empire before the Great War and the population of the region consisted of Turks and Kurds.⁷⁸ Lord Curzon countered by pointing out that the Turks were now only 12 percent of the population. Curzon further explained that Britain gave a promise to the Arab nations to protect their independence; that Kurds were not Turks; and they did not want to live under Turkish rule. Mosul traded with Aleppo, Syria and Baghdad, not Anatolia. Turkish control of Mosul was bad for the security of Iraq. Curzon denied the Turkish allegations that Britain was in the region to exploit the oil reserves.⁷⁹ Curzon said that they recognized the right of the Turkish Petroleum Company, but that the oil should be open to all nations,

⁷⁶ Ibid, January 18, 1923, *ibid*, 22.

⁷⁷ Ibid, January 29, 1923, *ibid*, 39.

⁷⁸ Ibid, January 23, 1923, *ibid*, 28.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 29.

and Britain was prepared to send the Mosul case for arbitration to the League of Nations. Ismet rejected arbitration and offered a plebiscite instead. Curzon countered by saying that a plebiscite was not reliable because the population was illiterate. At the same meeting, Child commented that the U.S. appreciated Britain's efforts to keep Mesopotamia open for other nations. He, however, felt it necessary to refer to Curzon's specific mention of the validity of the claims of the Turkish Petroleum Company.

Having observed the negotiations between Turkey and Britain over Mosul, the U.S. delegate decided to support Turkey's claim in early January. While the conference was taking place, a group of Americans were in negotiations with Turkish officials in Angora in order to revitalize the Chester Concessions. When obtaining this concession became a strong possibility in early January, the U.S. delegate informed Ismet that if his government granted the concession, the U.S. would support Turkish claims in Mosul.⁸⁰ Although the documents under study are silent on the Turkish response, the following events indicate that the Turks must have accepted this offer. That was why, perhaps, Child indicated in late January that Britain did not have the right to claim the Mosul region.⁸¹

Almost two months after the conference started, there was no sign of a consensus at the sub-committee meetings. Finally, France and Britain agreed to give an ultimatum to the Turks. If the Turks did not sign the treaty, the Allied

⁸⁰ Bilal N. Simsir, *Lozan Telgraflari*, 340.

⁸¹ Grew, January 23, 1923, Grew Papers, 31.

diplomats threatened to leave Lausanne.⁸² The Turks were in a state of “dazed and childish stupidity,” Grew confided in his diary, without the ability to yield or to make any constructive suggestions.⁸³ The final day of the conference came on February 4, 1923. Bristol, Child and Grew went to the hall that led to Curzon’s room where the Allied powers met with Ismet. The hall was packed with diplomats and journalists. Ismet appeared at the door, “descending the stairs followed by his delegation; he took off his bowler hat, and bowed right and left to the crowd in the hall, smiling broadly and left the hotel.”⁸⁴ The conference was broken without any prospect for peace.

Chester Concession Revitalized

On April 9, 1923, in between the two meetings of the Lausanne Conference, the Chester Group received a concession from the Turks in the name of the Ottoman-American Development Company (OADC).⁸⁵ The concession included road and railway buildings, construction of public utilities, creation of a new capital in Ankara, new harbors in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and development of oil and mineral resources along the lines of the railroad for 99 years. The concession included the oil reserves in Mosul as well.⁸⁶ According to the

⁸² Ibid, February 3, 1923, *ibid*, 53.

⁸³ Ibid, February 2, 1923, *ibid*, 48.

⁸⁴ Ibid, February 4, 1923, *ibid*, 56.

⁸⁵ Herbert Feis, *The Diplomacy of the Dollar: First Era 1919-1932* (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1965), 55.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 56.

concession, the exclusive railway, mineral and oil concessions covered 20 kilometers on either side of a 2,400-mile right-of-way, beginning in Angora and covering today's eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq. OADC estimated it would spend one billion five hundred million dollars for the entire construction project.⁸⁷

By granting the Chester Concession, the Turks made progress towards their short and long term objectives. In the short term, the Turkish government wanted to divide the Allied front by bringing the U.S. to its side. The Turks understood that the U.S. would not allow Britain to have exclusive rights in Mosul. The Turks decided that they would rather have political authority over Mosul and let the U.S. exploit its underground resources than surrender the region entirely to Britain. In the long run, Turkey needed money and technical assistance to rebuild its destroyed and bankrupt country. In their dealing with Admiral Bristol, the Turks showed that they preferred U.S. development and assistance, which would help the Turks rid themselves of the European imperialism under which they suffered for centuries.⁸⁸ The Chester Concession railway system was considered vital by the Turks for the future defense of the country. In a newspaper interview, Mouhtar Bey, chief engineer of the Eastern Railways, who was also the first Turkish Ambassador to the U.S. in 1930, indicated that the railways were essential to his country's future.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Benjamin Gerig, *The Open Door and The Mandates System: A Study of Economic Equality Before and Since the Establishment of the Mandate System* (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD., 1930), 146.

⁸⁸ Bristol to A.W. Dulles, Department of State, July 28, 1923, Box 39, File: Correspondence June, 1-31 1923, Bristol Papers, 6.

⁸⁹ RG 43, Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions. Folders 26-75 Box 4, Entry 121, Folder: Press, *Aksham*, April 17, 1923.

The timing of the concession's ratification was not a coincidence. Preparing for the second meeting at Lausanne, the Turkish government planned to make a final push for its Mosul claim. By granting the Chester Concession to the Americans, the Turks gambled that this would influence the U.S. to back Turkey in their struggle to include Mosul in the new republic. Furthermore, the Turks calculated that even if they could not obtain Mosul, they would use the case to score in other fields such as getting rid of financial and judicial capitulations. That was why the Turkish government compelled the members of the National Assembly to attend a Sunday meeting. In this Grand Assembly session, Rauf Bey, the Prime Minister, claimed that the Chester Concession would help Turkey militarily and economically.⁹⁰ The Assembly easily secured the ratification of the concession by a large majority.

France immediately protested the Chester Concession.⁹¹ On April 16, the French Ambassador informed the U.S. Department of State that the right to build certain railroads in Anatolia before the war had been granted to the French in consideration of a loan to the Turks of a billion francs. France had already loaned about half the money and had started construction before the war broke out. While the French supported the Open Door policy, they considered it inconsistent with that principle for one concession to be annulled and another to be granted in

⁹⁰ Ibid, *Ikdam*, April 14, 1923.

⁹¹ April 21, from the U.S. Embassy at Paris to the American Mission at Lausanne, File: 24 Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43 Records of International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions. International Conference Records U.S. Mission Lausanne Conference Second Phase Records. General Records, Apr. – Aug. 1923, Folders 17-24 Second Committee. Entry 121 (Hereafter referred to as RG 43).

its place. He was told that the Department had incomplete information regarding the Chester Concession.⁹² Britain also protested the concession on the ground that Mesopotamia was not under Turkish jurisdiction.⁹³

Now that the French and British were hostile to Chester, Bristol believed that American prestige required that Chester be given effective support.⁹⁴ The Department of State recognized the ratification of the Chester Concession as a triumph of Open Door policy that would prevent the British from claiming the region for themselves.⁹⁵ The Department instructed Joseph Grew, on the day he was to depart for Lausanne for the second conference, that the U.S. should aggressively support the Chester Concession at the conference.⁹⁶

The Second Lausanne Conference

On April 21, 1923, Joseph Grew boarded a train in Bern to return to Lausanne.⁹⁷ This time he was hopeful that there would be an end to the Eastern Question. His optimism came from the fact that the Allied nations had come to realize that they must recognize the complete sovereignty of the new Turkish Republic. That was why there was a consensus among them that they were not going to seek economic and judicial interference in the new republic's affairs. Grew

⁹² Department of State to the Lausanne Mission, April 27, 1923. RG 43.

⁹³ U.S. Embassy at London to the Mission, May 4, 1923, Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Grew, April 21, 1923, unpublished diary, Grew Papers, 73.

predicted that the main focus of the second meeting at Lausanne was going to be pre-war concessions.⁹⁸ Before the conference, the British delegate warned that the Turks would try to play one party against the other.⁹⁹ It was too late, however, as the Turkish National Assembly ratified the Chester Concession two weeks before the conference, thereby making the U.S. an interested party for the Near Eastern oil reserves.

Joseph Grew headed the U.S. mission to the conference; both France and Britain were represented by their respective commissioners in Constantinople, General Pelle and Horace Rumbold; the Italian delegation was headed by Montagna, Minister to Athens; and once again the head Turkish negotiator was Ismet Pasha. The U.S. repeated its strategy from the first conference and joined the second meeting as observers.¹⁰⁰ Grew informed the Allied representatives that they were ready to cooperate, but did not intend to involve themselves in the negotiations.¹⁰¹ Because the U.S. objective was to have a fair share of the Near Eastern oil reserves through the Chester Concessions, Secretary Hughes asked Grew to eliminate any obstacle at the conference that would endanger the

⁹⁸ From the American Mission at Lausanne to the U.S. Embassy in London, June 6, 1923: File: London Embassy, Box 1. RG 43.

⁹⁹ Grew Papers, Diary 1, 1923, May 1.

¹⁰⁰ The State Department to the U.S. Embassy at Berne, April 19, 1923, File: 20 American Delegation, Box 3. RG 43, 2.

¹⁰¹ From Grew to the Department, April 27, 1923, Lausanne, Folders 26-75 Box 4, RG 43.

Concessions.¹⁰² During the negotiations, the U.S. remained the only power that rejected the Allied concession requests.¹⁰³

Turkey's goal was to terminate the capitulations, remove the Ottoman debts, and take back Mosul. The Turks broke the negotiations once before and they would not have hesitated to break it again even, if it resulted in war in order, not to give any judicial or political rights to foreign nations. Ismet was adamant that capitulations had been abolished after September 1914 when the Ottoman Empire had entered the Great War and sent a note to all capitulatory powers that capitulations were no longer tolerated by the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰⁴ Ismet established that foreigners in the country could continue to live and do business, but they were bound to the new Turkish laws.¹⁰⁵

On April 22, Ismet proposed to Grew that the two countries strengthen their economic relations, not only by concluding a treaty but also with economic concessions. After all, the Turks showed their good faith by granting the Chester Concession. He stated categorically to Grew that no step that he might take at Lausanne would in any manner prejudice valid U.S. rights.¹⁰⁶ Ismet mentioned that General Pelle planned to bring up the Chester Concession at the conference, and he asked what the U.S. response would be. Grew simply indicated that the U.S.

¹⁰² From the State Department to the U.S. Embassy at Berne, April 19, Box 3, File: 20 American Delegation, RG 43, 6.

¹⁰³ From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, July 7, Box 3, File: 24 Concession 2 of 2, RG 43.

¹⁰⁴ From Grew to the Department of State, April 27, 1923: Box 1, File: 9A, 1 of 5, RG 43.

¹⁰⁵ From Grew to the Department of State, May 1, 1923, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Lausanne, July 8, 1923, RG 43, Box 4.

always protected its legitimate rights.¹⁰⁷ Grew understood that the Turks would not accept the most-favored nation clause, and would demand reciprocity from the United States.¹⁰⁸ The Turks pointed out that they considered the Treaty of 1830 to be abrogated and that there were no consular conventions drawn up since the abolition of the capitulations. Therefore, they wanted to negotiate a separate convention. According to the Turks, all pre-war treaties were capitulatory; the capitulations were abolished; therefore, the pre-war treaties were abolished.¹⁰⁹

After the conclusion of the first Lausanne Conference, France no longer had any territorial ambitions in the Near East. The primary French goal was to recover some of the pre-war investments in the Near East. In that regard, General Pelle informed Grew that the Chester Concession touched French interests in the Samsun-Sivas railway on the Black Sea region and the development of the port of Samsun.¹¹⁰ Pelle further explained that France had negotiated for the Samsun-Sivas railway with the Ottoman officials in Paris and Constantinople in 1914 and provided for a French loan of eight hundred million francs for the Ottoman government.¹¹¹ These agreements were confirmed by an Imperial law on April 8, 1914. The Ottoman parliament approved it in June and the Parliament passed a

¹⁰⁷ Grew, April 22, 1923, Diary, 77.

¹⁰⁸ Grew to Bristol, May 17, 1923, RG 43, Box 4, Folder 31, 2.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, May 17, 1923, 1, (Separate letter from ibid).

¹¹⁰ From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, May 29, 1923, File: 24 Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43, 1

¹¹¹ Ibid.

law confirming the loan on July 14, 1914.¹¹² France paid an advance of five hundred million francs and started building the railway. Three weeks later work stopped due to the outbreak of war between France and Germany.¹¹³ In February 1922 Hamid Bey, the representative in Constantinople of the Grand National Assembly, gave General Pelle assurances that the French pre-war concessions would be respected. Pelle informed Grew that the French government did not wish to interfere with the Chester Concession but that it would demand compensation in some other form.¹¹⁴ Later in the conference, Grew urged Ismet to compensate the French company; because Grew was involved, Ismet guaranteed compensation to France.¹¹⁵

The head Italian delegate, Montagna, expressed hope that Italy and the United States might work together in the Near East. He believed that in contrast to France, Italy, with an increasing birth-rate and vigorous laboring population, must have room for expansion. That Italy looked toward infiltration of Asia Minor was no secret. When Grew told him that beyond equal economic opportunity the U.S. had no political interest in Turkey, he answered that political influence naturally followed economic influence and that in 25 years, more or less, when the new republic finally crumbled, both the U.S. and Italy shall be among those present. He

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid, 2.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 6, 1923, File: 24, Concession (1 of 2), Box 3. RG 43, 5.

said Italy was politically weak but she was militarily, sociologically and philosophically strong.

Britain wanted mandates over Mosul and Palestine, as well as a safe evacuation of Constantinople.¹¹⁶ During the negotiations, the British delegate used other matters – judicial and economic concessions and war reparations – as bargaining chips in order to control the oil fields. Early in the conference, the matter of concessions was taken up in informal conversation between Ismet and the European Allies. These delegates requested that concessions signed before August 1, 1914 be confirmed as well as concessions for which the regularization had begun but not been completed before August 1, 1914.¹¹⁷ This would be a blow for the Chester Concession as the request would validate the Turkish Petroleum Company's claims in the region. Feeling the pressure, Ismet asked Grew to make presentations on this subject to the Allied delegates.¹¹⁸

Ismet visited Grew on June 6. He complained that the other Allied delegates were forcing him to sign a treaty confirming pre-war concessions that were not legally valid.¹¹⁹ He warned Grew that this move was specifically directed against the Chester Concession and that he might be forced to yield in the interest of peace. When Ismet asked for Grew's opinion, Grew said that Turkey had fought

¹¹⁶ From the American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 5, 1923, File: 24 Concession 1 of 2, Box 3. RG 43.

¹¹⁷ Grew to Bristol, June 5, 1923, RG 43, 1.

¹¹⁸ Grew to Bristol, May 17, 1923, Box 4, Folder 31 RG 43, 1.

¹¹⁹ American Mission at Lausanne to the Department of State, June 6, 1923, File: 24, Concession (1 of 2), p. 1. Box 3. RG 43.

for its sovereignty and should not yield on such an important question.¹²⁰ When Ismet asked about the U.S. response if the Turks should yield, Grew declared that the U.S. would not accept the principle of legalization of pre-war concessions.¹²¹ In other words, the U.S. was not going to leave Mosul to the British. Receiving the exact response he sought, Ismet kissed Grew on both cheeks. The Turks now had the Americans behind them, which would make it more difficult for the British and French to push the Turks around at the conference.

After long negotiations, the Turks and the British agreed to settle the Mosul boundary issue within nine months after the signing of the Lausanne Treaty. If it was not settled by then, it would be referred to the League of Nations.¹²² Grew proudly informed the State Department that there was not going to be any mention of the Turkish Petroleum Company nor any prior or future concessions in the treaty. The U.S. mission successfully eliminated from the treaty all of the objectionable provisions relating to concessions.¹²³

After Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty with the European Allies, the U.S. signed a separate treaty with Turkey, which established equal relations between the two countries. The U.S. achieved its two primary goals at the conference: preventing Britain from extending its sphere of influence in the Near East and continuing the Chester Concession. While the U.S.'s 1920's foreign policy mentality dictated an aggressive Open Door policy, the Turkish receptiveness

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Grew to the Department of State, June 26, 1923, File: 9A, (1 of 5), Box 1, RG 43.

¹²³ Grew to the U.S. Embassy in Paris, July 18, 1923, File: Paris Embassy, Box 1, RG 43.

towards American capital in the region was instrumental to accomplishing this mission. By granting the Chester Concession to the U.S. at just the right time, the Turks caused tension between the Allies and the U.S. In the end, Britain recognized in principle American interests in the region. Although the Turks ultimately failed to assert their control over Mosul, the issue helped them to end the Allied occupation of Asia Minor and create a fully independent state.

After he replaced Woodrow Wilson and became President in 1921, Warren Harding reintroduced Open Door and Dollar Diplomacy policies as the foundation of U.S. foreign policy his administration. This was the driving force behind the U.S. delegation during the Lausanne negotiations. For the many Americans who believed in Wilson's idealism, however, an Open Door policy was tasteless and contradicted U.S. national values. From its signing until its rejection in the Senate in early 1927, the American public engaged in an intense dispute regarding the ratification of the Treaty.

CHAPTER III

AMERICAN PUBLIC'S REACTION TO THE LAUSANNE TREATY

With the Lausanne Treaty, the U.S. government agreed for the first time to have diplomatic relations with a predominantly Muslim nation based on the principles of equality and reciprocity. Yet a broad cross-section of the American people considered the Turks to be culturally, religiously and ethnically inferior. They believed that a treaty with the Turks was pointless because the Turks would not recognize international rules and regulations. This common perception of the Turks was based on broadly accepted stereotypes that were reinforced in the media.¹ For example, Turks were routinely depicted as ugly and uncivilized, particularly the Turkish men who were living a hedonistic life style in their harems filled with Christian girls. This stereotypical view of the Turks was reinforced by the news of Turkish atrocities against Armenians during the Great War in 1914 and 1915.²

¹ For some Turkish depictions in U.S. media, refer to these cartoons, "Turkey Must Remain in Europe" *Literary Digest*, April 3 1920 Vol. 65 No. 1, 25. "The Unspeakable Turk" *Literary Digest*, December 18, 1920 Vol. 67 No. 12, 15. "Uncorked by the War" *Literary Digest*, May 6, 1922 Vol. 73 No. 6, 23. "It Ain't Polite to Interrupt" *Literary Digest*, June 17, 1922 Vol. 73 No. 12, 11.

² The Ottoman Empire's handling of the Armenian independence movement in Anatolia in 1914 and 1915 is a cause of a serious disagreement between historians who called the event as "Genocide" and those who claimed that it was a "civil war." There is a consensus among many European and North American historians that the Ottoman government systematically exterminated close to one million Armenian civilians. A group of mostly Turkish historians, on the other hand, claim that what happened was a civil war among Turks, Kurds and Armenians which resulted in many casualties and death on all sides. During the research at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress in Washington DC, I came across several eye witness accounts that support the "Genocide" interpretation.

The Treaty with Turkey was no longer a matter of recognizing a relatively obscure country, but a matter of protecting American purity and honor by abstaining from relations with Turkey. It was just as important to assist and protect Christians under their rule. The opposition to the treaty created an ideological language that was communicated through race, gender and religious codes. This ideological language, originated from the Turks' massacres of the Armenians during the Great War, strengthened the popular anti-Turkish view that was the basis for the Senate's rejection of the Treaty in January 1927. Some opponents fused these religious and racial arguments with anti-business interests in support of their moralistic approach to U.S. foreign policy

The Opposition to the Treaty

Opponents of the Treaty founded committees, mobilized churches, and sent individual petitions to their elected officials and policy makers to try and change U.S. Open Door policy, as well as to assist and protect the Christian population in Turkey. The anti-Lausanne discourse galvanized the Democratic Party leadership ideologically and provided it with a broad-based, popular issue with which to oppose the Republican administration. The anti- Lausanne movement also demonstrated the impact of religion, racial prejudice and gender roles in U.S. foreign policy making. Immediately after its signature, the Lausanne Treaty became the next chapter in the struggle between Christianity and Islam. This Crusading mentality was channeled towards inspiring many Americans to save innocent Christian women and girls from Turkish savages.

By sending separate notes to the President, the State Department and individual Senators immediately after the signing of the Treaty, the Congregational Ministers of Idaho registered their concerns about potential future massacres of Christians by Turks.¹ The ministers' petition claimed that Muslim Turks, by inheritance and religion, were incapable of treating Christians humanely.² They pleaded with the U.S. government to apply the "sternest justice for the past and most rigid restrictions for the future."³ Another group of Baptist ministers declared that the U.S. needed to go to war against the infidel Turks in order to save the Armenians.⁴

In a petition to U.S. Senators, one hundred and ten Episcopalian bishops, led by Bishop William Manning of New York, claimed that Christian sentiment in the U.S. was strongly against such a treaty with an "anti-Christian government" that killed one million innocent Christian men, women and children, and was holding tens of thousands of Christian women and children in harems.⁵ These Bishops claimed that it was the U.S.'s moral obligation to help Christian Armenians.⁶

¹ From Idaho Congregational Conference to Borah, March 10, 1920. Boise, Idaho. Box 83, File: 1919-20 Foreign Affairs, William Borah Papers, (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC) hereafter, Borah Papers.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1964), 203.

⁵ *A Protest to the Honorable Claude A. Swanson: Against Ratification by the Senate of the Lausanne Treaty Negotiated Between the United States and Turkey at Lausanne on August 6, 1923*, by One Hundred and Ten Bishops. Publication time and place is unknown, however, it appears that this pamphlet was published some time during the second half of 1926. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 1.

⁶ Ibid, 2.

Bishops from the Northern Baptist Church, Methodist Episcopal Church South, Reformed Church, and Episcopalian Church denounced the treaty in a letter to the Senate immediately preceding the vote on the Treaty. These bishops wrote that the Treaty ignored the U.S.'s moral obligations towards Armenians and broke Wilson's promise to give them an independent homeland. They argued that the treaty condoned massacres of Armenians and abandoned "untold thousands of Christian girls now in Moslem hands to their fate." According to these bishops, only big businesses supported the treaty. The letter concluded that the Treaty would be a dishonor to the U.S. and Christian churches.⁷

In addition to organized church opposition, there were other committees established against the Treaty. One of them was the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA). According to the ACIA, the Turks made an alliance with the U.S. State Department in return for their support of an Open Door policy in the Near East.⁸ The ACIA described it as "dishonorable" that the Chester Concessions determined the U.S. government's position at Lausanne.⁹ In an ACIA pamphlet, the Turks were portrayed as the "most primitive and backward branch of the Mongolian race."¹⁰ Turks were also characterized as a mixture of races,

⁷ January 8, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, PG.1-3482, 1926-27 Cong.69, Sess.2, microfilm No. 174, 1266.

⁸ "Kemalist Turkey," in *The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey*, New York, 1924, 48. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39.

⁹ "The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey," by American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, New York: 1924, *ibid*, 13.

¹⁰ Charles H. Kirby, "The Turks," *ibid*, 48.

including black slaves of Sudan and Central Africa, and as a result they represented a "lower type" of people.¹¹

A member of the ACIA, James W. Gerard, former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, accused Secretary Hughes of lying about the connection between U.S. policy at the Lausanne Conference and the Chester Concession.¹² Gerard also accused Hughes of changing his opinion about Armenians after he became the Secretary of State. He accurately noted that Hughes supported Armenian independence in 1919.¹³ He also pointed out that Turkish and American representatives at Lausanne worked together to abolish capitulations and resolve the Armenian issue in Turkey's favor. In return, the Turks accepted the U.S. Open Door policy as the basis for foreign relations.¹⁴ In the Chester Concession case, Gerard accused the Department of State of reverting "to the old and discredited policy of Dollar Diplomacy."¹⁵ He concluded that American honor depended upon keeping its promise for an independent Armenia.¹⁶

Historian Merlo Pusey, biographer of Charles Hughes, wrote that Hughes had been an active member of the Armenian Committee for the Independence of Armenia before he became the Secretary of State. Early in 1919 Hughes advocated for American protection of Armenians. Turkish atrocities against this

¹¹ Ibid, 48-49.

¹² James W. Gerard, "A Scandalous Treaty," *ibid*, 13.

¹³ *Ibid*, 14.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 16-17.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 17.

¹⁶ *Ibid*.

Christian minority during the war aroused U.S. public opinion, and Hughes at the time supported U.S. intervention on Armenia's behalf while the troops were already in Europe.¹⁷ Once he became Secretary of State, however, Hughes believed that the possibility of intervention no longer existed. He concluded that most of the U.S. troops had left Europe, the Turks were prepared to fight to protect their territorial integrity, and the U.S. public would never support sending soldiers to die in Turkey. Pusey explained that when the Lausanne Conference opened, Hughes' inability to protect the rights of the persecuted and decimated Armenians in Turkey left him in an embarrassing position. Pusey claimed that the anti-Lausanne people never forgave Hughes for abandoning the Armenians' fate to the Turks.¹⁸

Another domestic committee active in this debate was the American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty (ACOLT). In one of their 1926 publications, ACOLT asserted that the Treaty was against "the spirit of Christianity" as well as "the ideals of America."¹⁹ According to ACOLT, the treaty defied Wilson's promise for an independent Armenia. ACOLT claimed that the Treaty was an approval of a government "founded upon murder, rape and rapine;" it sullied American honor; undermined U.S. obligation to Armenia; was "un-American" and

¹⁷ Merlo J. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, Vol. II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 574.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ *The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty*, based in New York. Publication place and date is unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published in New York City some time during the second half of 1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 33 of 41, Conts. 40-41.

un-Christian.”²⁰ According to Ernest Riggs, an ACOLT member and previous missionary in Asia Minor, Wilson’s acceptance of an Armenian homeland agitated the Turks, increased their hostility, and contributed to Turkish violence against the Armenians directly. This explains why the U.S. had a moral obligation to protect the Armenians.²¹

Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. (1856-1946) was a leader in the opposition movement. As an admirer of Woodrow Wilson, Morgenthau was a strong believer in American moral superiority over other nations. This superiority, according to him, brought moral responsibilities.²² He believed that most of the nations of the world were immoral, but the U.S. was unique and should therefore demonstrate that it was an ethical and peaceful nation through its policies and actions. Then, the U.S. can “sit in judgment upon international disputes” and resolve international conflicts fairly.²³ One of the responsibilities of the U.S., he asserted, was to deal with the Turks. During his tenure as Ambassador in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Morgenthau Sr. witnessed the extermination of Armenians. When the U.S. entered the Great War, he returned to the U.S. and became an ardent advocate of an Armenian state.

²⁰ Ibid, 5.

²¹ *The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty*, based in New York, “A Missionary on the Lausanne Treaty,” signed by Ernest W. Riggs (March 1926), *ibid*.

²² Henry Morgenthau, “*America’s Moral Responsibility to the World*” Speech at the Church of Covenant in the Washington DC in November, 1921. The Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel 20-41, Conts. 23-24, 9.

²³ Ibid.

The greatest opponent of the Treaty in the Senate was William King, a Democrat from Utah. According to King, the Lausanne Treaty was opposed by Democratic senators upon these grounds: "It failed to provide for the fulfillment of the Wilson award to Armenia, guaranteeing protection of Christians and non-Moslems in Turkey, and recognition by Turkey of American nationality of former subjects of Turkey...American commerce with Turkey – actual and potential – is a trifling matter of but a few millions of dollars annually and needs no serious consideration."²⁴ After traveling in Turkey and Russia in 1925, King concluded that the U.S. should recognize the Bolsheviks before the Turks.²⁵

King additionally drafted legislation to bring this issue before the Senate. In June 3, 1924, for example, he introduced a resolution that charged the Treaty with betraying the Armenians. The Resolution also invited the Senate to investigate the relationship between the Chester Concession and the Treaty.²⁶ A month before the Senate vote, King introduced another resolution reminding his colleagues of Wilson's promise to the Armenians and highlighting the relationship between the Open Door policy and the Chester Concessions.²⁷ King correctly perceived that

²⁴ Why the Democrats Defeated the Turkish Treaty, *The Literary Digest* for January 29, 1927. Box 91, Notebook-News Clippings, Bristol Papers, 10.

²⁵ *The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty*, based in New York, "Senator King's Reply," signed by William H. King (March 9, 1926), 14. Publication place and date is unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published in New York City some time during the second half of 1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 33 of 41, Conts. 40-41. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC.

²⁶ Congressional Record Vol. 65, PT.10-11, PG.9583-11,367, 1924 Cong.68, Sess. 1, microfilm No. 166, 10292.

²⁷ Res. 306. December 22, 1926, Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, PG.1-3482, 1926-27 Cong.69, Sess.2, microfilm No. 174, 910-911.

the Turks granted the Chester Concessions in order to secure the moral and diplomatic support of the U.S. delegation in Lausanne.²⁸

The Lausanne Treaty had its outspoken detractors in the most prestigious universities. Even among scholars, racist and bigoted language was employed to defeat the treaty. Albert Bushnell Hart, Professor of government at Harvard University, wrote many articles condemning U.S. foreign policy in the Near East and criticizing the Treaty. Hart claimed that the U.S. government ignored public opinion when negotiating the Treaty.²⁹ According to Hart, the Treaty assumed that the Turks were a civilized people who would honor their promises. Hart claimed that the Turks were of Asiatic stock and had been a “dreadful curse” to Europe for six hundred years.³⁰ As a barbaric nation, they first destroyed the Byzantium Empire and enslaved Christians who were “superior to them in culture.” He characterized the Turks as far more alien to the European culture than the Chinese and Japanese people.³¹ Hart believed that the Turks were incapable of excelling in literature or business; they knew only how to fight.³²

Hart conceded that the educated Turk was “delightful” and loved “dogs, children and wives and flowers and nature; but at heart he is still a Mongol

²⁸ Ibid, 911.

²⁹ Albert Bushnell Hart, “Dead Against the Turkish Treaty,” in *The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey*, New York, 1924, p. 5. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39.

³⁰ Ibid, 6.

³¹ Ibid, 7.

³² Ibid.

Tartar.”³³ He wondered: if the Negroes in the U.S. revolted, seized power, and reduced the white race into bondage, would other nations make treaties with this new country?³⁴ He claimed that as long as the Turks controlled the western side of the Bosphorus, there could not be a treaty as they were an unreliable nation that could not be trusted to protect their Christian population.³⁵ He explained that Britain and France signed treaties with Turkey because they had financial interests in the region, but that the American people were opposed to this type of commercial diplomacy.³⁶

Hart believed that as an Asiatic race the Turks were unfit to be a civilized nation and that was why the U.S. should not associate with them.³⁷ Exhibiting a complete disregard to the realities of African Americans in the U.S., he further claimed that the new Turkish regime was racist because of their treatment of the minorities and he labeled them the Ku Klux Klan of the Near East.³⁸ According to Hart, President Wilson did not recognize the Huerta government that was “founded upon force” in Mexico; he then asked why the U.S. should have relations with the

³³ Albert Bushnell Hart, “Dead Against the Turkish Treaty,” 11.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Albert Bushnell Hart, “Making Friends with Unrighteousness,” *Forum*, December 1924, Vol. LXXII, No. 6, p. 735.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Albert Bushnell Hart, “Reservations as to the Eastern Question,” *Annals of the Academics of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 108, America’s Relations to the European Situation (July 1923), 120.

³⁸ Ibid, 122.

Turks “who are below the level of Mexicans in moral fiber and no higher in self-government?”³⁹

An influential publication at this time was *Kemal's Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty*.⁴⁰ According to this document, there were between 100,000 - 400,000 Christian girls in Turkish harems. Christian girls of 14 years of age were taken into Turkish harems and younger girls were “farmed out to Arabs and Kurds” until they grew up.⁴¹ It also indicated that thousands of women killed themselves rather than marry Moslem men, causing a disgrace to Christianity.

This piece stated that the

multitude of white Christian women, girls and children, [were] helpless in the hands of Moslem owners-unable to escape from Moslem bondage-subject to foul indignity and bestial brutality. We think of young white children who are being farmed until they reach the age of 14 who are for sale. We think of the appalling fact that the Anglo Saxon race of Britain and America stands by and sees these things. We think of girls as educated and refined as any that can be found in Britain or America forced to be wives of Moslems – forced oftentimes by beating and threats of death to repeat the Moslem formula before the Mullah. Christian girls are waiting to be rescued.⁴²

Other opponents to the Treaty included A.D.F. Hamlin, Dean of the School of Architecture at Columbia University, who postulated that the U.S. signed the Treaty because the U.S. was too cowardly to consider an armed conflict with the

³⁹ Albert Bushnell Hart. “Making Friends with Unrighteousness,” 738.

⁴⁰ Publisher and publication time is unknown. This document is available at The Papers of Henry Morgenthau Sr. Conts. 40-41, Reel No. 33 of 41.

⁴¹ *Kemal's Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty*, The Papers of Henry Morgenthau Sr. Conts. 40-41, Reel No. 33 of 41, 2.

⁴² Ibid, 7-8.

Turks.⁴³ He characterized the Lausanne Treaty as a sign of "infamy, a piece of national cowardice, and a symptom of moral bankruptcy."⁴⁴ Oscar Solomon Straus objected to the Lausanne Treaty because it abolished the capitulations and entangled the U.S. in European affairs.⁴⁵ Straus was convinced Turks were not civilized enough to have a Western type of judicial system, and that placing Americans under Turkish rule was dangerous.⁴⁶ Wilfred M. Post, who worked in Turkey as a medical missionary for 21 years, criticized the Treaty in his 1926 pamphlet⁴⁷ that claimed the U.S. government placed American institutions in Turkey under Turkish law with the abandonment of capitulations.⁴⁸ Wilfred reminded readers that this was the government that murdered thousands of Armenians and destroyed Smyrna.⁴⁹ He concluded that the Treaty was "one sided, unsatisfactory, humiliating and dishonorable."⁵⁰ James Paulos, a chocolate shop owner from Minnesota, on behalf of seven hundred thousand Greek citizens of the U.S., ten thousand Greek citizens of Montana and seven thousand Greek ex-

⁴³ A.D.F. Hamlin, "A Treaty of Surrender," in *The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey*, New York, 1924, p. 31. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Oscar Solomon Straus, "Objections to the Lausanne Treaty," in *The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey*, New York, 1924, p. 46. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39. Although he did not explain why the Treaty would cause an entanglement in European affairs, the Chester Concession would have been the major reason of his belief.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 47.

⁴⁷ Wilfred M. Post, "An Indefensible and Humiliating Treaty" Publication place and date is unknown, however, the writer predicts that it was published some time during the second half of 1926. Found at Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 33 of 41, Conts. 40-41.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 2.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 13.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 15.

servicemen who served during the war urged Senator Thomas Walsh, member of the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, to reject the treaty.⁵¹

Some evoked the Crusades to advocate for military intervention. On July 24, 1922, Hughes informed Harding of his conversation with Bishop Cannon of the Methodist Church. The Methodist Church adopted a resolution that said the U.S. government should take all necessary steps to help the Christians in Turkey, including sending soldiers.⁵² The Reverend Alfred Harding of the Protestant Episcopal Church of Washington sent a note to Hughes and requested that the U.S. make every effort — diplomatic, naval or military — that would help the Christians.⁵³

For some Americans the Lausanne Treaty symbolized an Islamic victory over Christianity, and their editorials and public rhetoric drew upon the Crusades metaphor to fuel public resentment and incite action. A few days before the Senate vote in early 1927, the *New York Times* editorialized that the rejection of the Treaty would be akin to the Battle of Tours between the Frankish Army and the Al-Andalus Empire of Spain in 732 A.D. According to the editorial, just as the Battle of Tours closed the doors of Europe to the spread of Islam, the rejection of the Treaty would represent another Christian victory over Islam.⁵⁴ The editor emphasized that

⁵¹ James P. Paulson to Thomas J. Walsh, October 8, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.

⁵² Hughes to President Harding, July 24, 1922. FRUS 1922, Vol. 2, United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1938, 931.

⁵³ Bishop Alfred Harding to Hughes, September 22, 1922. FRUS 1922, Vol. 2, United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1938, 938.

⁵⁴ *New York Times*, January 15 1927, "Hammering Islam," 14.

under the pending Treaty, Turks could come to the U.S. to convert Christians and Jews to Islam.⁵⁵ The writer warned the readers that if the Treaty was ratified, the call of the muezzin would be heard from the roofs of synagogues and churches.

Before the vote on the Treaty, Duncan Upshaw Fletcher (1859-1936), Democratic Senator from Florida, made a dramatic speech on the floor of the Senate that implored the members to vote against the Treaty. Fletcher began by saying that it was an insult to the honor and values of the U.S. to ratify the Treaty because it would legitimize a thousand years of Turkish barbarism. Fletcher characterized the Treaty as condoning wholesale murder, rape, pillage and every other kind of shameless infamy of the Turks. He exclaimed that for hundreds of years it was Christendom's goal to drive back the barbarian hordes of Turkey out of Europe and put an end to their rule over Christians. He continued that Turkish brutality was sustained through the Great War and their independence war, and Treaty supporters asked the U.S. to condone acts of outrage and violence against white Christian women. Upshaw also connected the Treaty to Dollar Diplomacy and big businesses' voracious and unchecked grab for power, resources and money, "which left out all morality in foreign policy." He accused the industrialists of uniting U.S. interests with the evil, infamous Turks. Big business, he warned, wanted the U.S. to ratify the Treaty while thousands of Christian girls remained enslaved in Turkish harems.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ January 18, 1927. Congressional Record Vol. 68, PT.1-3, PG.1-3482, 1926-27 Cong.69, Sess.2, microfilm No. 174, 1881.

Support for the Ratification

The opposition was wide-spread and prevented the Senate from achieving support in sufficient numbers to ratify the Lausanne Treaty. There were, however, outspoken advocates of establishing relations with Turkey in religious and education institutions. The Congregational Churches of the U.S. and its foreign missionary society, The American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, were strong supporters of the treaty. On April 12, 1926 the Commission on Foreign Relations of the National Council of the Congregational Churches unanimously decided to support the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.⁵⁷ Less than a month before the ratification came to the Senate floor, the Congregational Church sent separate letters to Frank Kellogg, the new Secretary of State, William Borah, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, and President Coolidge.⁵⁸ In these letters, the Congregational Church argued that the Lausanne Treaty would actually protect the American missionary, educational and philanthropic interests in Turkey that were over a century old. The letter further explained that Armenians would have the fullest protection only with the Treaty and the subsequent official presence of the American government through an embassy.

The First Congregational Church actively sought the support of the policy makers to ratify the Treaty. In a June 1926 letter to Senator Thomas Walsh, the

⁵⁷ The National Council of the Congregational Churches to Thomas J. Walsh, December 20, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.

⁵⁸ The National Council of the Congregational Churches to Thomas J. Walsh, December 20, 1926, *ibid*.

Church explained that they had invested millions of dollars in Turkey and they had a substantial number of missionaries and teachers in the field.⁵⁹ The letter assured Walsh that the treaty should be ratified for both the well-being of the American interests in Turkey and the development of this new state.⁶⁰

Charles Henry Brent (1862-1929), Episcopal bishop of Western New York, was one of the most prominent religious leaders who at first opposed the Treaty, but later changed his mind and supported it. He was originally a member of the one hundred and ten Bishops who opposed the Treaty and an executive committee member of The American Committee Opposed to the Lausanne Treaty (ACOLT). Bishop Brent was also a contributor to anti-Treaty publications.⁶¹ Over the course of a few years, however, he gradually changed his position and became a supporter of the Treaty.

In September 1926 Brent explained why he retracted his opposition. In a letter to Secretary Kellogg, Brent wrote that he wanted to dissociate himself from the extremely prejudiced, inconsistent, and inaccurate statements about Mustapha Kemal and the 100,000 women said to be in Turkish harems. He knew that the accusations in the *Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty* were untrue.⁶² He

⁵⁹ The First Congregational Church to Thomas J. Walsh, June 8, 1926, *ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ In *The Lausanne Treaty and Kemalist Turkey*, New York, 1924. Found at Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers, Reel No: 32 of 41, Conts. 38-39, 12.

⁶² Bishop Brent's Answer to the Editorial Entitled "As Seen by Two Bishops" in "The Living Church" of August 14, 1926., September 3, 1926. Box 30, File: Prayer Notes Etc, personal copy, Charles Brent Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington DC, 2.

stated, "It is easier to be consistent than honest."⁶³ He meant that maintaining the same opinion would have been the path of least resistance, but it would have been dishonest when his thoughtfulness and intellectual inquiry had taken him down a different road. Brent was also influenced by a list of over one hundred Americans in Constantinople urging Kellogg to ratify the Treaty. The signers represented every type of American activities in Turkey, including colleges, schools, and missionary and philanthropic organizations.⁶⁴

Brent clarified his point further by drawing a domestic parallel, stating that the U.S. was guilty of the crime of lynching, yet Congress refused to pass an anti-lynching bill, "so that this nation stands before God and the world as guilty as hell of every lynching that happens."⁶⁵ He pointed out that Americans condemned the Turks for their history, but wondered what Americans would think if other nations would refuse a treaty with the U.S. because of its dishonorable history of slavery and continued treatment of Blacks.⁶⁶ Brent confessed that ever since he read John Jay Chapman's (1862 – 1933) accusation that every American citizen was guilty of lynching, he felt pain in his soul whenever he heard about a lynching case.⁶⁷ While the U.S. was condemning the Turks for barbarous behavior, Brent preached that the Americans knew lynching was against "the law of God," but

⁶³ Ibid, 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 10.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 11.

⁶⁷ In 1912, Chapman held a memorial service for a lynched black Pennsylvania man on the first anniversary. His dramatic speech in the service appeared in *Harper's Weekly* (September 21, 1912). In *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Retrieved March 2, 2007, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: <http://www.search.eb.com/eb/article-9022484>.

refused to condemn this horrendous crime. He asked the American public what they would say if a foreign country refused to ratify a treaty, because Americans practiced and condoned the lynching of its own people, failing to protect the rights and lives of their own minority population.⁶⁸

Just as there were Ivy League academics opposed to the Lausanne Treaty, there were also advocates in favor of its ratification. Edward Meade Earle of Columbia University claimed that the ratification of the treaty would be simply recognition of a *fait accompli*. Like Bishop Brent, he reminded Americans that Americans should not apply different standards to other nations than what they apply to themselves.⁶⁹ In an article that he published in *Forum*, he pointed out that the U.S. criticized Turkey for ill-treatment of its minorities. Earle then asked his readers to consider the Negroes who did not enjoy any protection from courts in the south, and to remember the judicial injustice against the Japanese on the Pacific Coast.⁷⁰ He concluded by claiming that the Turks were no better or worse than other nations of the Near East, and the U.S. could not continue persisting with moralistic judgments and dictating terms to other sovereign nations that it labeled as criminal.⁷¹ Earle asserted that the U.S. needed to accept the present terms of the Treaty because it did nothing between 1917 and 1923 that could have laid the

⁶⁸ Bishop Brent's Answer to the Editorial Entitled "As Seen by Two Bishops" in "The Living Church" of August 14, 1926., September 3, 1926. Box 30, File: Prayer Notes Etc, personal copy, Brent Papers, 11.

⁶⁹ Edward Meade Earle. "Our Holier-Than-Thou-Policy" *Forum*, December 1924 Vol. LXXII No. 6, 742.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 741.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 743.

foundation for a different and more satisfactory treaty than Lausanne.⁷² He claimed that during this time period the U.S. never declared war on Turkey; President Wilson approved the landing of Greek army in Asia Minor; the U.S. did not participate in the making of the Sevres Treaty; and finally the U.S. Senate did not accept a mandate over Armenia in 1920.⁷³

There were other scholars who supported the Treaty. For example, the president of Mount Holyoke College, Mary E. Woolley, urged Senator Thomas Walsh to ratify the treaty.⁷⁴ The rejection, according to her, would cause Turkish hostility to American educational and religious institutions in Turkey.⁷⁵ Paul D. Moodey, the president of Middlebury College, also was one of the supporters of the treaty. In his letter to Thomas Walsh, he mentioned that people who lived in the Near East and knew the conditions supported the treaty.⁷⁶ He asserted that the reaction against the treaty generated “more heat than light” and urged Walsh to vote favorably for the treaty.⁷⁷ Finally, the business interests appealed to policy makers for the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. The Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, for instance, in a letter to Thomas J. Walsh explained that American

⁷² Edward Meade Earle, the speech at the 68th Luncheon Meeting of the Foreign Policy Association, Astor Place, New York. The transcript of the meeting was published as *The Lausanne Treaty: Should the United States Ratify it?*, Foreign Policy Association Pamphlets, No. 26: Series of 1923-24: New York, 1924, 8.

⁷³ Ibid, 8-9.

⁷⁴ Mary E. Woolley to Thomas J. Walsh, December 4, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

trade with Turkey and the Near East was handicapped because there was not a treaty specifying relations between the U.S. and Turkey.⁷⁸

The Lausanne Treaty Survives

Although the majority voted for it 54-30, the Senate did not have the two-thirds majority required to ratify the Treaty. Afterwards, the strong anti-Turkish movement gradually lost momentum due to the American people's weariness of international affairs and their desire to address the ills of their own society rather than criticizing the Turks. Ironically, the ideological platform based on race and religion became a major factor in the Coolidge administration's ability to reestablish the Lausanne Treaty. During the winter of 1926 when the opposition was at its peak, some opponents of the Treaty began to realize that the anti-Treaty movement devolved into mostly propaganda and was no longer a debate about U.S. policy.

Some of the previously adamant opponents switched sides to support the Treaty and turned the arrows of criticism onto social injustice issues in American society. This explains why the movement lacked the ability to mobilize again when President Coolidge disregarded the Senate's decision and activated the Treaty with the Turks in February 1927. By sending Mark Bristol to Angora, the U.S. de facto recognized the Turkish nationalist government and agreed to work with them by the terms agreed to in Lausanne. In the end, both the U.S. and Turkey lost a valuable opportunity to improve their policies. An impartial criticism

⁷⁸ Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce to Thomas J. Walsh, December 30, 1926. Thomas J. Walsh and John E. Erickson Papers, Box I: 321, File: LEG: Treaties.

of the Lausanne Treaty may have launched a reasoned debate on U.S. values in its foreign policy. It may also have pushed the new Turkish Republic to be more considerate with its minority rights, as a way to lessen U.S. concerns.

CONCLUSION

The U.S. negotiated the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, which established equal diplomatic relations between the two countries on the basis of the Open Door policy. The U.S. policy makers' main objective during the Lausanne Conference was to protect the recent privately-received Chester Concessions. The Chester Concessions exemplified the increasing significance of Near Eastern underground resources to big businesses and policy makers in industrialized countries. The Turkish National Assembly confirmed the Chester Concessions shortly before the assembly of the second Lausanne Conference in April 1923 in order to pave the way for U.S. support of Turkish claims against Britain and France during the conference. Although this calculated move did not place Mosul within Turkish borders — one of Turkey's expressed objectives — the U.S. support of the Turks against British and French pressure fulfilled another Turkish interest of breaking Western European imperial claims on Turkish sovereign territory. It can be postulated that the Turks successfully manipulated the U.S., using Open Door policy, to prevent Britain and France from imposing what would have been a disadvantageous treaty from the Turkish perspective.

The Lausanne Treaty, however, met with an unexpected reaction by the American public. Many Americans from different segments of the society found the Treaty intolerable and humiliating. Two factors contributed to this reaction: the Armenian situation and the preconceived prejudices against Muslims and Turks. During the Great War, the Ottoman Empire, predecessor of the Turkish Republic,

violently suppressed the independence movement of its Armenian subjects by systematically exterminating a large portion of their population. The news of this event circulated in the U.S. media and caused President Wilson to promise an establishment of an Armenian homeland after the Great War. Turks, on the other hand, successfully fought a war against the victorious Allies and declared their independence. This realistically ended any possibility of establishing an Armenian country in Asia Minor. When the U.S. government signed the Lausanne Treaty, many Americans perceived the Treaty as abandoning previous U.S. international obligations towards Armenians.

The second issue that strengthened opposition to the Treaty was racial and religious prejudice against the Muslims and Turks. Some Americans opposed the treaty simply because it put the U.S. on equal terms with a predominantly Muslim country. The perception of the Turks and Muslims extended the historical memory of the Christian-Muslim struggle from the Battle of Tours in 782 A.D. The opposition of many Americans to the Treaty did not allow the Senate to produce the two-thirds of the vote to ratify the Treaty and establish equal relations with Turkey in January 1927. The Armenian situation and the racial and religious prejudice created a common ground for the opponents of the Treaty to transmit opinion among many segments of American society. The Lausanne Treaty, however, ultimately survived because the Coolidge administration decided that it was in its best interest to implement the terms of the Treaty regardless of the vote in the Senate. It also understood that the opposition movement had lost its

strength and momentum. There was no political will to fight the Treaty again, and therefore little possibility of a public backlash.

This thesis employed four distinguished historians' theories to help explain the origins of the relations between the U.S. and the Turkish Republic between 1923 and 1927. Although all four theories help to understand different aspects of the relationship, no one can provide a singular intellectual framework when we study the entire sequence of events during this four year period. Walter LaFeber's "Open Door and Empire" theory describes the façade of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. policy makers principally sought free opportunity for all powers in the Near East. When the opportunity presented itself, like the Chester Concession, however, it did not hesitate to engage in an imperial struggle with Britain. LaFeber's theory, with its disregard for the public's impact on U.S. foreign policy making, does not sufficiently explain why the Lausanne Treaty was rejected.

Matthew Connolly's "small power politics" helped to explain the Turkish strategy during the Lausanne Conference. The new Turkish Republic's policy makers appreciated that the wealth of the Near East had the potential to divide the U.S. from the European Allies. That was why the Turks supported the U.S. Open Door policy and granted the Chester Concessions to the Americans. This enabled the Turks to have the U.S. on their side during the Lausanne Conference. Although the Turks could not regain Mosul, the U.S. support strengthened their bargaining power in other areas. It was perhaps due to U.S. support that the Turks were able to completely reverse the Sevres Treaty, which had put an end to the Ottoman Empire. Connolly rightly claimed that small powers take advantage of the

big power politics and are able to exert some influence on larger powers' policy making process. This theory also has its limits. Much as the Turks tried, they could not cause the U.S. to ratify the Lausanne Treaty. Although the Turks gained the support of the U.S. government at the Conference, the public turned against the Treaty. Since the Turks did not have any incentives to offer the American people, they could not ensure its ratification. The Turkish case suggests that Connelly's theory is not sufficient to explain the chain of events after the signing of the Treaty.

Michael Hunt's "ideology" theory fills the gap which LaFeber and Connelly left in their disregard for cultural norms, historical memory, and prejudices and their impact on foreign policy making. Hunt's description of ideology as a common language that transmits peoples' ideas to policy makers is vital to understanding why and how the Lausanne Treaty was rejected. Between the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 and the Senate's rejection of it in 1927, the public debate provided the Democratic Party policy makers with an ideological framework and thus legitimized their opposition in the Senate. Hunt's theory, however, does not offer any insight or explanation when examining the Lausanne Conference negotiations, the Turks' attitude, and the U.S. Open Door policy. Furthermore, the "ideology" theory is not equipped to explain President Coolidge's reactivation of the Treaty right after the Senate vetoed it.

Kristin Hoganson introduced the impact of gender relations and boisterous character on U.S. foreign policy making. The impact of the news of the Armenian Genocide and the propaganda around the myth of Turks keeping "white Christian girls" in their harems affected a large segment of the public to support acting manly

and save unprotected Christian girls. Although Hoganson's theory helps us to understand the path to reject the treaty, like Hunt's, it is limited and does not concern itself with the Open Door policy and the Turks' ability to influence events and their outcome.

If just one theory could explain the origins of the Turkish-American relations between 1923 and 1927, there would not have been a need to examine this historical period. Theories provide a framework to conduct research and analyze the results. The possibility of coming up with a simple explanation for the origins of U.S. policy towards Turkey and the hope of creating a new single theory became a naive dream. The theories of LaFeber, Connelly, Hunt, and Hoganson were important to deconstructing individual incidences and issues. When these theories were applied to a sequence of events, however, none of them were sufficient to understanding this time frame in its entirety.

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